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CONTRACT’S COVERT MEDDLERS
Sarah Winsberg*
Scholars of contract law typically examine contracts as bargains between two
parties. This approach elides an additional, key function of many contracts: to shape
existing relationships to the satisfaction of a third party, often one more economically
powerful than either of the two bargainers. Third-party litigants, especially creditors,
have historically advocated for their own interests and interpretive paradigms so
strongly that they have sometimes gained priority over the actual intentions of the two
bargainers.
This Article recovers the story of how a group of frequent-flier third parties—
mainly creditors of small businesses—shifted the rules of contracts between partners in
early America. By arguing for reinterpretation of small business contracts, creditors
fundamentally transformed labor and ownership practices. Curiously, third-party
influence on contracts is rarely studied by either historians or legal scholars. This
Article follows its tracks through the slow evolution of common law doctrine across the
nineteenth century.
Today’s contract law still chooses between the interests of third parties and those
of contracting parties themselves. These choices, however, go unacknowledged and
undertheorized both by the courts making them and in later analysis. Contract law
therefore allocates the burdens imposed by unfavorable interpretive rules without
examining who will bear the cost or why they should. Uncovering this hidden element
of doctrine allows us to appraise whether it matches the values that contract law intends
to uphold.
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INTRODUCTION
Every contract exists within a larger world. It meddles in the
interests of a wide variety of other actors: the parties’ customers and
suppliers, their investors and employees, their creditors and debtors,
and more. 1 Some of these third parties, in turn, want to meddle back. 2
They ask courts to enforce their own understandings of the contract,
if it is disputed, over those of the parties. They seek default rules
favoring their interests, and they may even try to limit which kinds of
contract will be legally enforced. When third parties—often creditors—succeed in shaping doctrine, they constrain or replace parties’
power to form relationships on their own terms.
This Article recounts a troubling historical example of creditor
influence on contract doctrine. In the early nineteenth century,
creditors argued strenuously for new rules governing partnership
contracts within the small stores and workshops that owed them
money. These contracts were, at the time, small businesses’ most
important tool to organize their own internal structure. By revisiting
1 See David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. 979, 987 (2021).
2 See Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REGUL. 211, 218–19 (2015).
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long-forgotten state court cases and contemporaneous legal literature,
I show how this litigation ultimately erased an alternate system of
norms and legal dispute resolution within American small business in
favor of a rigid distinction between partnership and employment.
Setting aside and even criticizing parties’ actual intentions, courts, at
the behest of creditors, imposed new limitations on the ways these
businesses could mix relationships of labor, ownership, control, and
liability. The undesired transformation of these small businesses, and
the lost promise of their now-vanished contractual norms, demonstrate
the dangers of unexamined third-party influence on contract doctrine.
Hiland Barton’s hotel in Eagle Bridge, New York was one of those
small businesses, unwillingly transformed in 1864. 3 Hiland ran his
hotel with the periodic assistance of his brother Eli, who lived at the
hotel with his own wife and children and also operated a small store
nearby. 4 The hotel relied on liquor dealer John Conklin for its
libations—and it was the hotel’s running debt to Conklin that would
soon bring the brothers onto unexpected legal terrain. When
Conklin’s agent arrived to check in on the hotel’s needs, he found Eli
on the job. Eli told the agent, “[W]e are out of Bourbon, and I guess
you had better send it up,” busying himself with the hotel’s daily chores
as Conklin’s agent observed. 5
No intentionally formed contract bound the Barton brothers’
relationship of mutual aid. But Conklin, suing the hotel for its
outstanding balance on the liquor, asked the court to read one in.
Conklin argued that Eli’s words had implied that he was Hiland’s
partner. 6 That implication, in turn, would make Eli as liable for the
hotel’s liquor debts as Hiland was—even if they had never intended to
form a partnership and would not be held partners for other
purposes. 7 The New York Supreme Court sided with Conklin, placing
responsibility for the miscommunication squarely on the Bartons’
shoulders. 8 To the court, Eli’s loose language of familial entrepreneurial cooperation ought, instead, to have matched the precise business
norm of the merchant he was dealing with: “[H]e should have said,
with frankness, that he was not a partner, and have repudiated the idea
that he had any connection with his brother’s business.” 9 Of course, it
would have been difficult for Eli to repudiate any connection with his
brother’s business while simultaneously assisting with its liquor
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Conklin v. Barton, 43 Barb. 435, 435 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1864).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
Id.
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purchases. But to the judges considering the case, the Bartons held
the responsibility to arrange their own relationship on terms familiar
to potential third parties like Conklin—or risk having a court do it for
them.
A century earlier, in eighteenth-century Anglo-America, sophisticated merchants and local small entrepreneurs like the Bartons would
have lived in essentially separate worlds. Back then, each group
resolved disputes in its own kind of legal forum, and each held
established, shared norms that shaped and limited the terms of the
contracts made within the community. 10 In the early decades of the
nineteenth century, however, merchants with cosmopolitan ties began
to take a greater interest in local enterprises. 11 When their loans to
and investments in these concerns went bad, requiring retrospective
inquiry into authority and liability within these small businesses,
merchant third parties asked courts to reread small business contracts
according to merchant norms and background rules, even if those
readings went against the parties’ actual intentions. 12
Courts
responded to their concerns, reshaping doctrine and rewriting
contracts to oblige third-party creditor litigants.
In cases like Conklin v. Barton, creditors of small businesses
disputed with their borrowers over the kind of participation that would
mark someone as “partner” within the enterprise, a key question that
determined who could be liable for debts, among other related
issues. 13 Litigants debated what should be assumed about a business’s
ownership, control, and labor, and whether contracting parties
deserved to be penalized if they had not rendered their relationships
legible to the sophisticated commercial world. Small businesses and
their creditors brought different expectations to the contracts they
formed. Each group relied on a robust set of background rules,
generally known within the community and enforced by law, to fill out
the terms of their contracts beyond those specified. Creditors,
however, conducted a successful campaign to force small businesses
into a choice between two business forms, neither of which precisely
matched their intentions. 14

10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Section III.B.
12 “[B]ackground rules,” as explained by Richard Craswell, are the default rules,
interpretive rules, and unwaivable limits that supplement a contract’s text. See Richard
Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489,
489–90 (1989).
13 For a summary of this question in present-day law, see ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, §§ 2.01–2.11 (1st ed. Supp. 2012).
14 See infra Part III.
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Just as in the nineteenth century, today’s courts regularly
adjudicate between third-party interests and parties’ own interests—
even though they frequently fail to recognize it. Indeed, substantial
parts of present-day contract doctrine, particularly in substantive areas
like partnership law, likely reflect third-party advocacy for default and
interpretive rules that favor their interests. 15 This allocation of
interpretive priority may well have advantages in some instances. In
other instances, however, it is harmful, as my historical research shows.
What is striking is that the balance of third-party and contracting-party
interests often goes unexamined as a matter of doctrinal principle and
substantive fairness. The tension between third-party and contractingparty expectations is an invisible element of contract’s background
rules requiring further analysis across the substantive contexts in which
it appears. By continuing to let it go unexamined, courts perpetuate
burdens on contracting parties ill-positioned to avoid them.
The pattern of unseen, yet influential third-party influence
extends beyond doctrine to individual contracts. Third-party pressure
evades regulation meant to improve fairness in vulnerable contractual
contexts like employment, tenancy, and consumer credit and sales.
Landmark twentieth-century legislation, from the Fair Labor
Standards Act to the Fair Housing Act, aimed to remediate inequalities
of bargaining power in contexts where one party may be particularly
disadvantaged in negotiation. These efforts, however, have important
loopholes because they do not consider third-party pressure.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss conceptual strategies this Article
employs to better reveal third-party creditor influence on the law.
First, drawing on “history of capitalism” historical methodology, I
focus on multi-party financial networks rather than on the binary,
hierarchical relationships that often characterized earlier economic
and labor histories. Second, I conceive the terrain of contract doctrine
as broad in subject matter—including substantively specific areas like
partnership contract. This approach allows me to observe how courts
form default and interpretive rules across varied substantive contexts.
In Part II, I then analyze two separate early American worlds of
contract law, and of partnership, showing how they relied on differing
assumptions and contract background rules. In early American small
business, partnership functioned importantly as a labor relationship,
linking labor with capital. For more sophisticated merchants, it mainly
united multiple sources of capital and then divided the profits between
contributors.
In Part III, I show how pressure from third-party creditors
produced a clash between these legal systems. Although American
15

See infra Part IV.
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higher courts were initially content to let local courts resolve disputes
over business structure according to the expectations of local
economic actors, creditors protested. American lawyers, urged on by
merchants extending credit more and more broadly, began to expand
the realm of commercial law to include ordinary trade and the labor
enabling it. Creditors, and lawyers supporting their agenda, wanted to
apply commercial law’s bright-line rules for identifying partnership
even to small businesses. They initially succeeded, although courts
soon began to balk at the unexpected outcomes this rule often
produced for the parties. Yet even their attempts at modification
continued to prioritize third-party expectations over the intentions of
contracting parties themselves.
This pattern of change has not been confined to the nineteenth
century, as I explain in Part IV. Today, too, third parties regularly sue
to enforce their preferred contract interpretation. Because common
law is built on precedent, this litigation in the aggregate shapes the
rules of contract. Yet scholars and judges alike have often failed to
think systematically about when third parties deserve special
consideration and when their understandings ought to lose. When
legislators have set out to regulate contracts, moreover, they too have
overlooked the role of third-party pressure, creating ever-widening
loopholes as a result.
This historical account makes several vital contributions to our
understanding of contract law. First, it reveals that our assumptions
about the interests that contract law balances are incomplete and
undertheorized. Contract rules may prioritize promisees over promisors or vice versa, for example, 16 but they also choose between both
parties’ interests and those of present and future third parties. Second,
it tracks the ways that third parties themselves intervene in that legal
balance to promote their own interests. With law’s help, third-party
influence can be transformative, remaking relationships on new terms.
Finally, it shows how devilishly tricky it can be to trace third-party
influence in doctrine, because courts have traditionally treated thirdparty interests as more “objective” than those of the parties or viewed
harms they suffer as indicative of fraud. Yet by reconstructing a clear
and pivotal history of third-party influence in the past, this Article
paves the way toward reexamination of present-day doctrine.

16 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986) (surveying schools of thought in contract theory).
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CONCEPTS FOR LOCATING THIRD-PARTY INFLUENCE

No contract exists in a vacuum. Every agreement is surrounded
by the parties’ present and potential future relationships. 17 These
intersections create third parties who may well have an interest in
influencing the terms of the contract or its subsequent interpretation.
Very often, they succeed. Yet in most respects, contract theory takes
little account of the influence and interests of specific third parties,
and has little to say about whether and when third-party interests ought
to prevail. 18

17 These patterns are reinforced by the “increased intensity and complexity of human
interaction” within the modern economy. PATTERNS OF A NETWORK ECONOMY 2 (Börje
Johansson, Charlie Karlsson & Lars Westin eds., 1994).
18 Here, some qualification is in order, as there are several cabined areas of law in
which courts and the scholars observing them do explicitly weigh the competing interests
of contracting parties and third parties. First, I omit consideration of those contracts in
which the parties intend to benefit third parties; that is, those falling within third-party
beneficiary doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (AM. L. INST. 1981)
(“A promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to
perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.”). Third-party
beneficiary doctrine solves the problem of privity, allowing someone not a party to the
contract to enforce it nonetheless, but because the doctrine rests directly on the intent of
the contract parties, conflict between contracting-party intention and third-party conflicting interpretation does not arise in the same way in these contracts. Moreover, it has
generally been interpreted relatively narrowly. See David G. Epstein, Alexandra W. Cook, J.
Kyle Lowder & Michelle Sonntag, An “App” for Third Party Beneficiaries, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1663, 1668 (2016). Another exception is, of course, in the law of bankruptcy, which
explicitly balances the interests of parties whose contracts cannot all be performed at once.
Yet because not every indebted or even insolvent business files for bankruptcy, these cases
are only a fraction of those in which third parties—including creditors—assert their
interests. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 8–9 (1986).
As Aditi Bagchi has explained, “Philosophers of contract tend to take the dyadic
(two-party) nature of private litigation, and of contracts in particular, to imply that only the
rights and duties of litigants toward each other are relevant to resolving their dispute.”
Bagchi, supra note 2, at 219. Fortunately, however, there is a “relatively nascent literature”
that constitutes an important exception, including Bagchi’s own work. Bagchi, supra note
2, at 212; Hoffman & Hwang, supra note 1, at 988; see also Daniela Caruso, Non-Parties: The
Negative Externalities of Regional Trade Agreements in a Private Law Perspective, 59 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 389, 404 (2018); Kishanthi Parella, Protecting Third Parties in Contracts, 58 AM. BUS. L.J.
327, 329 (2021). This recent work examines externalities of contracts; that is, their
economic impact on third parties and on society—but it aims its attention at weak third
parties in need of bolstered legal protection. Id. Indeed, theorists like Bagchi argue that
contract law accedes too little to third-party interests. Bagchi, supra note 2, at 212. They
analyze vulnerable third parties who bear the brunt of harm of corporate contracts—for
example, workers whose dangerous labor results from agreements forming international
supply chains. Caruso, supra, at 389–93; see also John F. Coyle & Robin J. Effron, Forum
Selection Clauses, Non-Signatories, and Personal Jurisdiction, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 192
(2021) (identifying harms to third-party non-signatory litigants created by contracts’ forum
selection clauses). This Article builds on this emerging line of research by showing that, in
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This Article makes methodological and theoretical choices
designed to highlight long-submerged third-party influence, as I
discuss in this Section. First, in choosing an arena in which to study
the history of contract, I have deliberately picked the small business
and its web of relationships with bigger players, rather than the large
industrial workplaces that informed an earlier contract history
scholarship, much of it produced in the 1970s. I argue that these
scholars, writing at the end of American industrialism, asked historical
questions befitting their contemporary context. Postindustrial capitalism demands a different kind of contract history that can historicize
new economic structures. Next, I define contract law’s domain
broadly, drawing on nineteenth-century understandings of what
counted as contract. This approach reveals that subject-specific
defaults, interpretive rules, and even constraints are entirely typical of
contract, and not in tension with it. It therefore better enables
comparison and evaluation of contract default rules, including those
with third-party effects.
A. Toward a New History of Contract
Historians have spilled much ink on the history of contract law,
and for good reason. 19 For a generation of scholars in the late 1960s–
80s, contract law held the essence of capitalism and its origins could
help reveal what capitalism really meant, for good or ill. 20 Legal
historians pointed out ways that contract law had once been different,
and had been molded into its current form by particular societal
interests. 21 They argued that contract law had been a key source of
injustice, and might still be rewritten to mitigate and undo those
effects. 22 Their opponents, scholars of legal theory and of law and
economics, though divergent on many points, together fired back with
analysis of contract law as representing timeless values of promise,

other contexts, contract doctrine often accedes to third parties too much rather than too
little.
19 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860 (1977); ROY KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
AMERICAN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (2007); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1975).
20 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and
Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 570, 577–78.
21 See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1 (1979);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY
9–10 (1965); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974); Morton J. Horwitz, The
Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 917–18 (1974); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976).
22 See Gordon, supra note 20, at 570–71.
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choice, and efficiency. 23 For them, contract law was ancient and had
changed slowly, and its developments represented progress in
response to new economic needs.
Their debate was defined by the moment when it occurred.
Scholars like Morton Horwitz and P.S. Atiyah, who recovered older,
fairness-based values within contract law, wrote at the peak of a long
period of American industrialization, during a transition whose
eventual outcome was not yet clear. 24 Through the lens of contract,
they debated what this now-receding order had meant, whether its
tradeoffs had been worth it, and what might come next. 25 At bottom,
the question was whether the kinds of arguably unequal transactions
that had formed and maintained industrial America—between
corporation and assembly-line worker, between wealthy land buyer and
hard-up farmer-seller, between mill operator and put-upon neighbor—were fair to individuals and beneficial to society; and if not, what
might replace them.
This classic work in legal history remains foundational in contracts
scholarship. Still, in crucial ways, it belongs to its moment. In the
factory, especially as imagined through the lens of Marxist class
struggle, the lines of hierarchy, interest, and contracting had been
relatively simple. 26 Workers toiled, owners profited, and the contract
23 On contract as promise, see, for example, CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:
A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 (1981). On contract as choice, see, for
example, Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules,
Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 783, 783
(1992). On contract as efficiency, see, for example, GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
24 On the 1970s as the beginning moment of “the destruction of an economic order
that seemed so rooted and pervasive,” see, for example, Jefferson Cowie & Joseph
Heathcott, Introduction to BEYOND THE RUINS: THE MEANINGS OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION 2–
4 (Jefferson Cowie & Joseph Heathcott eds., 2003).
25 Critical scholars identified modern contract with industrialization and wondered
what might replace it after the decline of both. Atiyah, for example, thought the substantive
fairness of premodern contract might be revived in a new age. See ATIYAH, supra note 21,
at 716–79. Duncan Kennedy, similarly, saw the legal tendency toward rigid enforcement of
contracts as born of the “nineteenth century . . . proposition[] that no man was his
brother’s keeper.” Kennedy, supra note 21, at 1686 (quoting F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE,
CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 1118 (2d ed. 1970)). Opponents rejected emphasis on
the Industrial Revolution, arguing that the essential qualities of contract were timeless ones:
“[F]rom the fact that contract emerged only in modern times . . . it does not follow that
therefore the concept of contract as promise . . . was itself the invention of the industrial
revolution; whatever the accepted scope for contract, the principle of fidelity to one’s word
is an ancient one.” FRIED, supra note 23, at 2.
26 Horwitz, Atiyah, and contemporaries were influenced by contemporaneous strands
of Marxism in economic and labor history, as both critics and admirers were quick to note.
See, e.g., Eben Moglen, The Transformation of Morton Horwitz, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1044
(1993) (book review).
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was the tool for bending those interests into synchrony. 27 It was no
wonder that scholars of the 1970s seldom contemplated those other
workplaces, whose importance would grow in the decades after this
scholarly debate, in which power emanated not from the employer but
from powerful interests external to the employment relationship.
History remains one of our most powerful tools for finding and
understanding elements of doctrine that, far from being natural or
neutral, embody preferences we no longer remember or recognize. If
history once helped us understand what industrialization had meant
in the law at a moment of postindustrial transition, the discipline is
now well-equipped to offer new kinds of insight. In the past fifteen
years, historians have developed new methodology for understanding
economic relationships. The work of self-identified “historians of
capitalism” has revived and reoriented history of the economy by
emphasizing how money, finance, and the intellectual tools they
require create exploitation. 28 For example, historians of capitalism
have studied how slavery and enslaved peoples’ experiences changed
in an era of rising financial sophistication, and how slavery was enabled
by northern investment and northern institutions. 29 Histories of
capitalism include victims—desperate slaves, oppressed wage workers,
and more—but few villains: individual employers are much less
consequential in these accounts than is the system of finance and
investment in which they inhabit middle rungs. 30 Historians of
capitalism have seldom directly considered contract law. 31 But, as I

27 Here, legal historians echoed the factory-centric approach of contemporary labor
historians. The “new labor history” of the 1960s–70s saw workers as fundamentally in
opposition to bosses and aimed its attention mainly at the factories and other large
workplaces best embodying this class division, even when such workplaces were relatively
rare. For description of the new labor history movement, and critique of what it left out,
see Bruce Nelson, Class, Race and Democracy in the CIO: The “New” Labor History Meets the
“Wages of Whiteness,” 41 INT’L REV. SOC. HIST. 351 (1996).
28 For a sampling of key work, see AMERICAN CAPITALISM: NEW HISTORIES (Sven
Beckert & Christine Desan eds., 2018).
29 For representative work within a large and growing field, see SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE
OF COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2014); DAINA RAMEY BERRY, THE PRICE FOR THEIR POUND
OF FLESH: THE VALUE OF THE ENSLAVED, FROM WOMB TO GRAVE, IN THE BUILDING OF A
NATION (2017); WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE
MARKET (1999).
30 See, e.g., SETH ROCKMAN, SCRAPING BY: WAGE LABOR, SLAVERY, AND SURVIVAL IN
EARLY BALTIMORE (2009). Oppressive conditions were created not by individuals but by “a
political economy that dictated who worked where, on what terms, and to whose benefit.”
Id. at 5.
31 For important exceptions, see generally Christine Desan, Beyond Commodification:
Contract and the Credit-Based World of Modern Capitalism, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J.
HORWITZ 111 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010); KREITNER, supra note
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demonstrate in this Article, the history-of-capitalism approach should
lead contracts scholars to place individual contracts in the context of
other financial relationships.
B. “Of the Subject-Matter of Contracts” 32
Where do the terms of a contract come from? One answer: the
written agreement of the parties. Yet in every time and place, the
explicit meaning of a contract’s written terms have told only part of
the story. 33 Contracting parties also rely on background rules: the
defaults, interpretive assumptions, and binding limits that fill in
inevitable blanks. 34 Where they work well, at least in most scholars’
view, these rules bear some relationship to the business norms of the
contracting parties: contract background rules may even explicitly
incorporate merchant usage or reasonable conduct, as the Uniform
Commercial Code does today. 35
The structural role of background rules within contract law,
however, is hard to pin down. Legal scholars frequently analyze background rules as a core feature of contract law. 36 For some, however,
background rules represent something other than contract law—and,
indeed, as such rules accumulate and are applied by courts in varied
situations, they eventually redefine disputes that might once have been
contractual as belonging to some other area of law. 37 This Article

19; Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J.
1383 (2014).
32 JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, NOT UNDER
SEAL; AND UPON THE USUAL DEFENCES TO ACTIONS THEREON xi, 92 (London, S. Sweet
1826). Chitty’s work was soon reprinted in Boston and Philadelphia and, with added
American annotations, became a leading reference for American lawyers. See Sarah
Winsberg, Recategorizing Early American Law: Legal Literature and Knowledge Formation
in the Early Republic, in Lawyers and the Boundaries of Labor: 1780–1860 (forthcoming
2022) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
33 Craswell, supra note 12, at 489–90.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(2) (AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LS.2020) (“[The Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are . . . to permit the
continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of
the parties.”).
36 See Craswell, supra note 12, at 489–90; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989);
Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
651, 652 (2006); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 618 (1990).
37 See Lawrence M. Friedman & Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching:
Past, Present, and Future, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 805, 812 (“[W]hen problems become socially
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adopts the first, broader view: background rules are key elements of
the law of contract. Nineteenth-century legal thinkers endorsed this
approach. They saw “the subject matter of contracts”—including
background rules—as crucial to the law and enforcement of
agreements.
When English legal treatise-writer Joseph Chitty sat down to
summarize contract law in 1826, he offered his readers some
information on principles applicable to all contracts. Chitty defined
the term “Contract,” for example, and he also discussed assent,
consideration, and contract interpretation. 38 Quickly, though, Chitty’s
attention turned from contracts in general to particular kinds of
contracts. In a single, much-subdivided “chapter” that spanned over a
hundred pages, Chitty outlined the doctrines applicable to contracts
based on their subject matter. Some principles applied to relatively
broad areas of contract law—contracts for sale of real property, for
debt, for services and works. Others were much narrower: contracts
for apothecary services, with inn-keepers, for wagers, and so on. For
each, Chitty showed how courts and occasionally legislatures had
developed specific ways to interpret, and sometimes constrain, these
contracts. The “[s]ubject [m]atter of [c]ontracts” was so important to
Chitty that, by his second edition in 1834, the chapter had expanded
to nearly half the book. 39
For Chitty and contemporary Anglo-American legal thinkers, the
structure of contract doctrine was clear. Contract was a concept that
described and regulated a broad array of agreements and
relationships. At the same time, contract doctrine also included rules
specific to the varied types of contracts. These rules offered defaults,
interpretive paradigms, and hard limits developed by common law and
occasionally by statute to serve the needs of these varied contract
settings. Present-day contracts treatises are, of course, no longer
usually written this way. 40 Treatises may refer to the underlying subject
matter of contracts and the rules that have developed around it—but
they usually do not take on the task of summarizing or analyzing

significant enough to be litigated with any frequency, they tend to be ‘removed’ to new
areas of the law where contract doctrine is either irrelevant or plays a minor role.”).
38 CHITTY, supra note 32, at 1. Chitty defined contract as “every description of
agreement, or obligation, whereby one party becomes bound to another, to pay a sum of
money, or perform, or omit to do, a certain act.” Id.
39 CHITTY, supra note 32, at 92; JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE

LAW OF CONTRACTS, NOT UNDER SEAL; AND
THEREON (London, S. Sweet 1834) (1826).
40
xxii.

UPON THE

USUAL DEFENCES

TO

ACTIONS

See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2004), xi–
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different corners of the business world and the rules evolved to govern
them. 41
Nonetheless, this Article argues, the subject matter of contracts
remains a vital aspect of contract doctrine. In the language of modern
contract theory, the subject matter of contracts is its area-specific
background rules: defaults, interpretive rules, and constraints. 42
Viewed narrowly, the modern subject matter of contracts includes the
default rules most classically identified with this field of law: those rules
found, for example, in the Uniform Commercial Code. 43 Viewed a bit
more broadly, such rules would certainly include those of partnership
contracts, given their common law lineage and tight link with
commercial law. 44 Viewed even more expansively, the subject matter
of contracts includes the rules and constraints for all kinds of presentday contracts, from employment and landlord-tenant contracts to
marriage and corporate charters. 45
A broad understanding of the scope of contract law—sometimes
termed “contractarianism”—is at times associated with an antiregulatory perspective. 46 Legal thinkers who see the corporation as a
“nexus of contracts,” for example, often oppose mandatory corporate
law provisions that parties cannot disclaim via contract. 47 Their
opponents deny that contract can fully describe these relationships
and advocate regulation. 48 Chitty and his contemporaries, however,
41 Chitty on Contracts itself, now in its 33rd edition as of 2019, remains an interesting
exception. It continues to devote an entire volume, one of two, to “Specific Contracts,”
including agency, employment, insurance, sales, and more. See JOSEPH CHITTY & HUGH G.
BEALE, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS (33d ed. 2019).
42 Craswell, supra note 12, at 505; see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 36, at 88; Ben-Shahar
& Pottow, supra note 36, at 652; Johnston, supra note 36, at 618. Hanokh Dagan and
Michael Heller offer a similarly broad theory of the subject matter of contracts, though to
different ends, in The Choice Theory of Contracts. HANOKH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE
CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS (2017).
43 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, index.
44 See BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at § 1.02(b) (“Courts and lawyers have said
that the U.P.A. [Uniform Partnership Act] merely codifies or includes the common law.”).
45 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 1–3
(2006) (noting that corporate charters are contracts, and that corporations rarely alter the
default terms set by statute); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES,
LOVERS, AND THE LAW 230 (1981).
46 For an overview, see RICHARD HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 79–124 (1997).
47 See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 408–09 (1989) (reviewing contractarian corporations
scholarship).
48 Some of contractarianism’s opponents have been legal historians. Legal historians
like Lawrence Friedman recount how, in a variety of areas, disputes once governed by
common-law contract principles grew new subject-specific rules that soon constituted areas
of law in themselves. See Stewart Macaulay, Foreword to FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at iii (2011)
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embraced a different kind of contractualism, one in which regulation
of contract simply becomes part of the “subject matter of contract.”
When we understand contract law as a bedrock legal structure on
which subject-specific background rules also hang, as Chitty did, we
gain analytic insight. Some kinds of background rules are visible and
obvious in effect, especially those that aim to shield the little guy, as in
employment law. Background rules that protect the powerful are
often more difficult to suss out, however, as my historical research
demonstrates. Lining up varied contractual contexts as structurally
similar but substantively distinct allows for illuminating comparison.
We can ask: Why, through the processes of common law or statute,
have we chosen these background rules for this kind of contract? And
for whose benefit do those rules operate?
II.

PRECURSORS

Background rules define the terrain of contract law in every era
and setting—and in early America, they differed from the setting of
locally centered economic bargains to that of cosmopolitan merchants.
In local-level American law, some kinds of contracts—especially the
long-term work contract of apprenticeship or indentured servitude—
recorded most of their terms explicitly and in writing. These contracts
had major stakes for local governments because of their relationship
with poor relief and social control, hence their rigorous formality.49
Other contracts, including those dividing work and ownership within
small businesses, were more often verbal, and relied heavily on
background rules to fill in those details not specified by the parties.
Disputes over these contracts were the domain of justice courts, where
justices incorporated unwritten yet legalistic principles of
decisionmaking alongside those more formally delineated.
Within the world of merchants, default rules had equal significance. Eighteenth-century Anglo-American merchants benefitted
from the ongoing project of Lord Mansfield and the Court of King’s
Bench, who were diligently constructing a newly modernized
(over a decades-long study of Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions, “the subject matter of
pure contract was taken away by other bodies of law” including “insurance, employment,
and trade regulation.”). Under a Chitty-style frame of analysis, however, it is possible to
conceive fields of law as remaining fundamentally contractual even as they accumulate new
and important background rules.
49 Another kind of contract most often formalized in writing was the land sale: also a
bargain with significant public stakes. See, e.g., Reeve Huston, Land Conflict and Land Policy
in the United States, 1785–1841, in THE WORLD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY AMERICAN REPUBLIC:
LAND, LABOR, AND THE CONFLICT FOR A CONTINENT 324, 325 (Andrew Shankman ed.,
2014); JOHN G. WELLS, WELLS’ EVERY MAN HIS OWN LAWYER, AND UNITED STATES BOOK
FORM 28 (Providence, R.I., D. Kimball & Co. 1857).
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commercial law meant to govern and reflect transatlantic merchant
practice of the time. These two distinct worlds of economic norms and
legal resolution operated harmoniously by dividing the turf of contract
dispute between them, rarely crossing paths—at least for the time
being.
A. Local-Level Contract Law in Early America
The defining feature of early American law was its pluralism; that
is, different legal systems regulated different people in different
respects. 50 Contract law was no exception. Whole categories of
contracts were generally regulated not by the main body of common
law deployed by state supreme courts, but instead by a subset, “justices’
law,” specific to certain kinds of disputes with little money at stake.
Within the domain of justices’ law, moreover, contracts took two
different forms. Some contracts, especially long-term labor agreements like indenture and apprenticeship, were highly formal and
highly specified by the parties. These contracts required such an
approach because of their consequential social stakes. Other
contracts, like those of more casual workers or of partners in small
enterprise, were often unwritten. These contracts frequently relied for
key terms on default rules that translated community norms and
expectations into legal outcomes, where the parties had not specified
otherwise.
1. The Domain of Justices’ Law
In early America, cases with monetary stakes below a certain
threshold were heard by justices of the peace in town justice courts. 51
Like manorial courts, borough courts, and more, justice courts were
50 In discussing early America in this Section, I refer to the period roughly from the
seventeenth through early nineteenth centuries. On the sociological concept of legal
pluralism, see Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988). On
pluralism as a defining feature of early American law, see, for example, THE MANY
LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001);
LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES,
1400–1900 (2010).
51 See James A. Henretta, Magistrates, Common Law Lawyers, Legislators: The Three Legal
Systems of British America, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 556 (Christopher
Tomlins & Michael Grossberg eds., 2008). On justice courts, see LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE
PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN
THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH (2009); Brendan Gillis, Conduits of Justice: Magistrates
and the British Imperial State, 1732–1834 (May 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana
University) (ProQuest); Sung Yup Kim, Justices of the Peace, Lawyers, and the People: Local
Courts and the Contested Professionalization of Law in Late Colonial New York (Aug. 2016)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Stony Brook University) (ProQuest).
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part of a long English tradition of competing and overlapping
jurisdiction: different venues drew authority and method from
different legal traditions, and accordingly offered their services to
litigants on different terms. These plural legal traditions overlapped
and crossed paths, and all could ultimately be appealed to central
courts, in theory. 52 Still, the law of justice courts differed meaningfully
from that of central courts. Rather than consulting the full panoply of
common law doctrine, justices applied local statutes crafted for justice
court use, alongside what English and American legal elites sometimes
termed “justices’ law,” a locally varying, often orally transmitted set of
legal traditions. 53
What was justices’ law? One way to understand this form of legal
knowledge is as simply another branch of common law, dealing with
those topics that most often came before justices of the peace. Indeed,
any eighteenth-century law bookseller could point interested readers
toward a shelf full of English lawbooks on the topic of “Justices of the
Peace,” filed carefully between, for instance, those on “Entries of
Declaration, etc.” and those on “Maxims and Grounds of Law.”54 On
the other hand, though, justices’ law could also be understood as
something much more intentionally separate from common law. On
this view, emphasized by historian Laura Edwards, justices’ law
represented a competing jurisdiction with distinct and potentially
conflicting rules, characterized largely by localized norms and judicial
discretion. 55 Indeed, early eighteenth-century English reformers had
taken steps precisely to heighten colonial justices’ discretion and
separate them further from more formalized common law: for
example, by banning practicing lawyers from serving as justices. 56
The feature of justices’ law most distinct from its formalized
counterpart, as Edwards has explained, was its treatment of disputes
with a public dimension, including crimes and other issues seen as
breaching the “peace.” 57 The “peace” was a flexible legal concept that

52 Henretta, supra note 51, at 560.
53 “[J]ustices’ law” was a term used to describe this sphere of law by some, though not
all, contemporaneous legal thinkers. See, e.g., Conley v. Good, 1 Ill. (Breese) 135, 136 (Ill.
1825) (“The justices’ law requires the justice to decide the case according to law and equity,
and dispenses with written pleadings.”).
54 These headings are taken from JOHN WORRALL, BIBLIOTHECA LEGUM (London, 4th
ed. 1738) (1731).
55 See EDWARDS, supra note 51, at 3–7.
56 Gillis, supra note 51, at 29. Gillis argues that eighteenth-century British law
deliberately emphasized discretion for justices of the peace, particularly in the colonies,
because discretion made magistrates an adaptable, powerful tool for maintaining order
within empire. See id. at 110.
57 EDWARDS, supra note 51, at 106–07.

2022]

CONTRACT’S COVERT MEDDLERS

1281

helped protect order and maintain hierarchy. 58 The weight of a
litigant’s demands and/or witness’s testimony was adjudicated
through her “credit,” or local reputation, which would be tied to her
status position but also might fluctuate based on the character her
neighbors had observed in her. 59 Using the rubric of the “peace,” a
justice could, for example, protect an enslaved woman’s possession of
cloth that had been taken by someone else and order it returned to
her, on the grounds that the theft had disturbed the peace. 60 Under a
common law analysis, the enslaved woman would not be considered to
own the cloth in the first place, and in fact could not have testified in
court at all. Still, because he began by classifying the case as one of
justices’ law and not of property law, the justice would never have
opportunity to reach these alternate common law questions. 61 Even at
its most capacious, however, justices’ law was legalistic. Within a given
locality, litigants could generally expect consistent procedure and
similar logics of disposition from case to case. 62
Low-value civil matters, especially debt cases, were another major
part of justices’ law, perhaps the most numerous kind of case on the
docket in many jurisdictions. 63 Their status as breach-of-peace cases,
or as some other part of justices’ law, may have varied by time and
place. 64 Either way, here, too, justice law adjudication did not look
quite like its common law counterpart. Book debt, meaning debt
recorded in an account book rather than memorialized in a formal
instrument enabling easier collection, dominated. 65 The debts
themselves were mainly delayed payments incurred for normal
exchange rather than borrowed cash: for example, many cases
58 Id.
59 Id. at 112–13.
60 Id. at 133–36.
61 See id. at 135.
62 For example, in one North Carolina district, as Edwards documents, litigants
seeking reconsideration petitioned justices using very similar, form-like language and
formatting, apparently crafting their petitions using the form and the type of supporting
reasoning that would be expected in that jurisdiction. Id. at 60.
63 In two late eighteenth century upstate New York counties, debt cases represented
at least 89% of litigation. See Sung Yup Kim, “In a Summary Way, with Expedition and at a
Small Expence”: Justices of the Peace and Small Debt Litigation in Late Colonial New York, 57 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 83, 89 (2017).
64 In Middlesex County, Massachusetts in the early eighteenth century, private civil
disputes could be addressed by a court with jurisdiction to keep the peace. See Hendrik
Hartog, The Public Law of a County Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282, 284 (1976). In early nineteenth-century North
Carolina, the “peace” framework did not apply to cases that the court categorized as purely
civil, not implicating public interests; justices would decide these cases with somewhat
greater attention to formal common law. EDWARDS, supra note 51, at 60.
65 Kim, supra note 51, at 68.
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demanded wages for laborers’ past work. 66 Many justice courts
employed regularized, but simplified procedure. 67 Procedure aside,
common law technicalities contributed little to the way justices
resolved these cases: justices generally examined bills and account
books to determine the amount and validity of the debt, and
summoned witnesses if the debt was disputed.68
Where justices’ law principles were implicated, they could be
applied not only by justice courts but also by higher local courts or even
higher state courts hearing cases on appeal. For example, Edwards
finds even Judge Elihu Bay, then sitting on the Court of General
Sessions, an intermediate-level trial and appellate court, applying a
legal principle nowhere to be found in formal lawbooks.69 It seems
likely that local courts would have applied justices’ law much more
often than appellate courts did. 70 The boundaries of justices’ law,
then, were defined primarily by legal substance: it resolved certain
kinds of disputes with primarily local-level significance. That substance
overlapped often, but not entirely, with the justice court venue.
Evidence of justices’ law practices remains frustratingly scarce in
many respects. Justices generally recorded the outcome of each case
in a docket book, but its reasoning much more seldom; the same habits
were typical for judges in local trial and lower appellate courts. 71
Moreover, many such records have been lost over time, although
scarce surviving records of justice court reasoning have informed
fascinating recent historical work. Yet because examining these
unsorted manuscript records is painstaking, historians seldom
research specific justices’ law questions and their typical resolution. 72
Collecting and separating on-point cases from among all those heard
has, at least thus far, generally proved prohibitive beyond the most
commonly encountered issues. As a result, compelling evidence of
justices’ law practice on particular legal questions comes instead from
appellate decisions. Appellate court decisions often recorded evi66 Id. at 70.
67 Id. at 85–87.
68 Id. at 86.
69 EDWARDS, supra note 51, at 26; R.W. Gibbes, Early History of the Judiciary of South
Carolina, in 1 JOHN BELTON O’NEALL, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF
SOUTH CAROLINA ix, ix–xi (Charleston, S.C., S.G. Courtenay & Co. 1859); O’NEALL, supra,
at 53–59.
70 Indeed, Edwards finds county courts, in addition to justice courts, operating in ways
“typical of localized law.” Id. at 220–21.
71 Id. at 23.
72 Edwards, for example, examined records difficult to decipher because they were
“written in a crabbed hand and sometimes streaked with water damage and age,” not to
mention “the past depredations of large insects and small mammals,” organized and
labeled, at best, only by date and case heard. Id. at 22.
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dence and reasoning originally considered at trial, providing indirect
evidence of local legal norms—particularly where local legal norms
clashed with new, competing applications of commercial law. 73
2. Formal Local-Level Contracts
Perhaps the paradigmatic formal contract in early America was
the apprenticeship contract or indenture. Long-term, youth-oriented
labor agreements served a crucial social function for early American
towns: an indentured servant or apprentice would be housed, fed, and
hopefully deterred from crime by his employer and would not make
demands on the local poor relief system. 74 Short-term, casual labor
made no such guarantee against destitution, and therefore held much
less importance in the hierarchy of early American political concerns.
Because long-term labor contracts held such significance not only for
the parties, but also for towns and their poor relief duties, these
contracts were heavily formalized. They also crossed the boundaries
of common law and justices’ law: these contracts were the subject of
much attention in both justice of the peace manuals and commercially
focused lawbooks. 75
Towns were vital early American political units, accounting for
much of the government service that a typical citizen might
experience. 76 Towns had two central responsibilities that account for
their interest in the law of labor contracts. First, towns saw themselves
as legally mandated to provide poor relief for the destitute who were
“settled” within their communities, as opposed to recent arrivals. 77
See infra Part III.
Ruth Wallis Herndon & John E. Murray, “A Proper and Instructive Education”:
Raising Children in Pauper Apprenticeship, in CHILDREN BOUND TO LABOR: THE PAUPER
APPRENTICE SYSTEM IN EARLY AMERICA 3, 3–9 (Ruth Wallis Herndon & John E. Murray eds.,
2009).
75 See, e.g., J. DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 273 (New
Bern, N.C., James Davis 1774); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE
OF CONNECTICUT 218–24 (Windham, Conn., John Byrne 1795).
76 For a classic account of towns and other units of local and state government as the
central backbone of regulation in the nineteenth-century United States and earlier, see
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 10 (1996).
77 I refer here to towns, though the relevant local political unit sometimes varied, as
did the details of poor relief systems. Still, American colonies shared a heritage in English
laws of poor relief and settlement, and consistently allocated this responsibility in significant
part to towns, counties, or parishes. On New England, see, for example, CORNELIA H.
DAYTON & SHARON V. SALINGER, ROBERT LOVE’S WARNINGS: SEARCHING FOR STRANGERS IN
COLONIAL BOSTON (2014); on the mid-Atlantic, see, for example, ROBERT E. CRAY, JR.,
PAUPERS AND POOR RELIEF IN NEW YORK CITY AND ITS RURAL ENVIRONS, 1700–1830 (1988);
and on the South, see, for example, Alan D. Watson, Public Poor Relief in Colonial North
Carolina, 54 N.C. HIST. REV. 347 (1977).
73
74
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That duty had high stakes: each poor family represented a significant
cost for the town that had to provide for them, and towns were quite
interested in deflecting responsibility where possible. In New England,
for example, towns “warn[ed ]out” poor arrivals, notifying them that
any responsibility for future indigence would remain with the family’s
prior locale. 78 Towns frequently litigated with each other to determine
which town would be on the hook. 79 Second, towns held responsibility
for redressing crimes within their borders, and they often strove to
prevent these moral lapses in the first place by shielding residents from
the temptations of idleness (itself a frequently punished crime in
seventeenth-century colonies). 80 Early America’s exceptionally youthful population compounded these challenges: in the 1760s and 1770s,
the proportion under age twenty approached or exceeded half in most
American colonies. 81 The vigorous young were more likely participants in crime and disorder, 82 and, without accumulated life resources,
they were especially vulnerable to poverty. 83
Long-term labor relationships, when successful, provided vital
assistance to towns on both these counts. Arrangements like indenture
and apprenticeship involved more than just labor: employers had to
provision these workers, and conceptually, they were part of the
household, even if on terms unequal in treatment and social status to
other household members. 84 The household patriarch had not only
the right to their labor, but also the right to exercise a more personal
discipline. Most such workers, though not all, were children or young
adults, because they outnumbered their elders and because early
78 On warning out, see DAYTON & SALINGER, supra note 77, at 1–2, 4; see also RUTH
WALLIS HERNDON, UNWELCOME AMERICANS: LIVING ON THE MARGIN IN EARLY NEW
ENGLAND 2 (2001).
79 Surviving reports of this kind of case are voluminous and fascinating: they persisted
past the colonial period well into the early national period and nineteenth century. To take
just one example, see Respublica v. Caernarvon Twp., 2 Yeates 51 (Pa. 1796) (determining
whether pauper Catherine M’Donald had obtained a settlement in the town of Caernarvon,
and therefore a right to receive relief from the town, when her then-husband bought a lot
there).
80 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 34
(1993).
81 ROBERT V. WELLS, POPULATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES IN AMERICA BEFORE
1776: A SURVEY OF CENSUS DATA 269 (1975).
82 On fears of children extending into the nineteenth century, see, for example,
Laura Jean Soderberg, “Vicious Infants”: Antisocial Childhoods and the Politics of
Population in Antebellum U.S. Literature (2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania) (ProQuest).
83 See, e.g., John E. Murray, Bound by Charity: The Abandoned Children of Late EighteenthCentury Charleston, in DOWN AND OUT IN EARLY AMERICA 213 (Billy G. Smith ed., 2004).
84 See CAROLE SHAMMAS, A HISTORY OF HOUSEHOLD GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA
(2002).
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Americans viewed labor for another as, aspirationally, just a life stage:
workers hoped to graduate eventually to land ownership or another
form of self-employment. Long-term labor agreements thus allowed
towns to delegate the responsibilities of providing for poor youth and
policing their behavior. 85
Because long-term labor relationships had such important stakes
for towns, they required highly formal contracts, which were in turn
interpreted in accordance with a voluminous body of doctrine on the
subject. 86 Contracts of apprenticeship and indenture, unusually
among common-law contracts of the time, were invalid unless put in
writing; a contemporary legal writer found this requirement “a very
reasonable provision; for room is left for controversy, from the
uncertainty of parol testimony.” 87 Cases on the books specified the
nature of the relationship further, explaining who was entitled to any
wages earned by the worker outside the household; how the
enforceability of the contract would vary if signed by the minor worker,
his parents, or both; how the relationship could be ended; whether it
could be transferred to a new master; and more. 88 Other cases
addressed legal questions relating to the practice of “binding out,” in
which town officials identified children of impoverished families and
assigned them to work, in exchange for sustenance, for another local
family. 89
The law of long-term labor contracts, then, mandated explicit,
written spelling out of parties’ commitments, limited and interpreted
by doctrine spanning legal fora from highest to lowest. Had these
relationships been governed by a more permissive set of background
rules requiring less explicit specification of intentions, they would have
been much less useful to towns. Without legal oversight, a master
might shirk his responsibilities to the apprentice by treating him
poorly or by pawning him off on someone else the apprentice had
never agreed to work for: that would put the apprentice in a more
85 On labor relationships as social control, see CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM
BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865, at
228–29 (2010).
86 On the formal requirements of labor contracts for children, see HOLLY BREWER, BY
BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN
AUTHORITY 271–87 (2005).
87 TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME; OF PARENT AND CHILD; OF
GUARDIAN AND WARD; OF MASTER AND SERVANT; AND OF THE POWERS OF THE COURTS OF
CHANCERY 342 (New Haven, Conn., Oliver Steele 1816). Reeve surveyed all relevant legal
materials he could find, including both English law he found still relevant and early
American statutes and precedents. Id. at Preface.
88 Id. at 341–46.
89 Id. at 342–43. In addition to caselaw, this practice was also generally described and
regulated by local statute.

1286

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:3

vulnerable position, with only poor relief as backstop. 90 Without the
prospect of legal enforcement, moreover, an apprentice might
unilaterally end the relationship midway through, reducing the
master’s incentive to take on future children since he could not assume
that investment in a young, unskilled child would eventually pay off
with years of work from a more capable, older teen. 91 Towns would
not force master and servant to remain together in every circumstance,
but they wanted maximum clarity as to how these socially important
relationships would function and when they might dissolve. That
would put clear limits on their own poor relief responsibilities.
3. Unwritten Contracts and Default Rules
Apprenticeship and other long-term, formal contracts were not
the only ways to create labor relationships, nor necessarily the most
common. Across early America, workers frequently worked by the day,
week, year, or task. 92 These contracts, however, were typically formed
without writing. Nor were they shaped by a large body of commercialor property-law doctrine, or even written justices’ law or state statute:
one legal writer reported, of day labor, “there is nothing peculiar,”
identifying no cases or laws of interest on the topic. 93 Precisely because
these relationships were given less attention in written legal sources,
few records survive, and it is impossible to know the exact rate of casual
wage work across the colonial period. 94 Still, casual labor was always
common practice, even as it received very little legal attention. 95
One way of interpreting these relationships would be to
understand them as noncontractual. Because they did not interact
much with the highest-level, most well-documented parts of the legal
90 Id. at 345–46.
91 See id. at 344.
92 See David W. Galenson, The Settlement and Growth of the Colonies: Population, Labor,
and Economic Development, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE COLONIAL ERA 135, 166–69 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1996).
93 See REEVE, supra note 87, at 347; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*414. Blackstone noted that English “labourers . . . hired by the day or the week” were
subject to statutes containing “many very good regulations” compelling them to work in
certain circumstances. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *414 (emphasis omitted). But such
statutes, unlike English caselaw, did not necessarily have effect in America. Indeed,
annotating Blackstone, St. George Tucker responded to this language within the
Commentaries by noting, “[t]he laws of Virginia are perhaps defective in this respect,”
containing no such corresponding regulations. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
426 n.6 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803).
94 Galenson, supra note 92, at 166.
95 Id.
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system, they might exemplify noncontractual exchange, a kind of
relationship classically identified by Stewart Macaulay. 96 I argue,
however, that these historical relationships of casual labor are better
characterized as contracts, if relatively informal ones. 97 Workers could
and did turn to the legal system to resolve disputes: they simply did so
in local courts whose processes relied on oral legal knowledge to
supplement common law doctrine not designed for their purposes.
That oral legal knowledge likely included background rules encapsulating community norms for casual labor contracts, supplementing
parties’ explicit agreement. 98 For example, in one eighteenth-century
New York justice court, it appears that parties usually specified the unit
of labor (time or work product) and amount of compensation. 99 They
relied on oral-legal-knowledge default rules to fill in certain other
terms of the bargain: for example, that unpaid wages could be
recovered as book debt. 100
Among these casual labor disputes falling outside early American
common law doctrine, but inside local law’s jurisdiction, were those
involving workers whose role lay on the boundary of labor and
ownership. As I next explore, in early American small businesses,
owners nearly always worked, and workers often came to own. They
mixed contributions of labor, investment, and control in ways
unfamiliar to modern business practice, through agreements that lay
outside the scope of then-current commercial doctrine on partnership
contracts.
4. “Partner Wanted”
How do you tell the difference between a business’s co-owner and
someone who is involved in another way, like an investor, lender,
employee, or contractor? Sometimes parties explicitly label their
relationship through written contract. Still, in the eighteenth century
and now, the law will also read in a partnership where the relationship
meets certain criteria: crucially, division of the profits between the
putative partners will often lead to a finding that a partnership has
been formed. As I next discuss, this area of doctrine was gaining
precision and clarity in the transatlantic world of Anglo-American

96 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 55 (1963).
97 Macaulay’s concept is a spectrum from noncontract to contract: the relationships I
discuss here, like those in his research, did likely include elements of nonplanning. Id. at
57. Still, for the reasons I discuss, I find contract to be the more valuable conceptual tool.
98 Kim, supra note 51, at 70–73.
99 Id. at 71.
100 Id. at 72.
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mercantile law in the eighteenth century. 101 But outside that sophisticated sphere, though early Americans might often call themselves
“partners,” partnership doctrine had little sway. That was in large part
because of the context and purpose of early American businesses
themselves.
The vast majority of early American businesses were small. 102 As
late as 1880, even in the urban center of Philadelphia and in the
relatively scalable industry of manufacturing, most laborers shared a
workplace with twenty or fewer compatriots. 103 Earlier and outside the
big city, businesses tended to be smaller: many were owned and staffed
by a single family household, with wives acting as husbands’ surrogates
as needed. 104 In this context, partnerships were driven first and
foremost by the need for more labor. That gave them a kinship with
other kinds of labor arrangements. Moreover, when businesses hired
employees instead of making partners, they often used pay and
investment structures tied to the business’s success, seeking investment
from these employees and paying them bonuses, commission, or even
salary itself based on the level of profits. Indeed, small businesses had
little cash, so it was only logical that compensation would bear a
significant relationship with the enterprise’s profits, and that an
employee might be encouraged to invest capital if available. 105 The
result was an ill-defined and, in practice, often inconsequential line
between relationships of co-ownership and relationships of employment. Whether in partnership, employment, or in an undefined
relationship of joint enterprise, small businessmen consistently mixed
relationships of ownership, investment, salary, and profit sharing in
ways unfriendly to rigid doctrinal categorization.
Consider, for example, a math problem of the period. A Pine
Plains, New York justice of the peace engaging in some self-study posed
himself the following question involving a merchant and a young
fellow. If the young fellow could contribute £100 to the venture to
receive £40 of salary and returns, £200 to receive £55, and £300 to

101 See infra Section II.B.
102 See WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 33–35
(1995).
103 Id. at 34.
104 Ulrich describes wives working in this capacity as “deputy husband[s].” LAUREL
THATCHER ULRICH, GOOD WIVES: IMAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN IN
NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND, 1650–1750, at 9 (1982).
105 Small businesses lacked cash not only because of their size, but also because most
business was conducted on credit in early America. See Daniel Vickers, Errors Expected: The
Culture of Credit in Rural New England, 1750–1800, 63 ECON. HIST. REV. 1032, 1034–35
(2010).
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receive £70, what was the young fellow’s salary? 106 The magistrate
successfully performed his arithmetic: every additional £100 invested
would earn this young fellow £15 per year in salary. Yet the magistrate
might equally have posed the problem as a legal one: What, exactly,
was the relationship between the young fellow and the merchant? This
young fellow probably did not meet the definition of a partner, since
his salary was fixed and not tied to profits. But if he were classed as an
employee, or legal “servant,” his position would be a strange one: What
if he were fired shortly after putting in the money?
That the official, writing around 1845, did not ask these legal
questions reflected just how unremarkable such arrangements
remained from the eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth century,
despite their potential complications if subject to commercial law’s
inquiry. Entrepreneurs seeking help, and the clerks joining them,
constantly mixed relationships of labor, investment, and profit. They
made arrangements other than simple wages for employees and chose
partnership even when one partner contributed only his labor.
This kind of relationship, in which one partner funded the
enterprise while the other offered only his work, appeared daily in the
newspapers in thousands of “Partner Wanted” advertisements from
the colonial period through the mid-nineteenth century and beyond.
A New York bookseller and printer in 1798, for instance, sought a
partner because he had “more business than can be done without an
INTERESTED ASSI[S]TANT,” promising, “[t]he Terms will be made
easy,” and specifying only that “[o]ne acquainted with a Book-Store
and accounts will be preferred.” 107
Why seek a partner when looking for an assistant? Economic
historian Naomi Lamoreaux has documented many such
“partnerships” in Boston in the 1840s, in which one partner was the
existing owner of an enterprise, while a second, joining partner was
wholly inexperienced and brought only his labor to the venture. 108
Lamoreaux hypothesizes that the junior partners insisted on these
arrangements because they resisted the potential stigma of being a
mere employee. 109 Of course, sometimes junior partners did invest:
106 J.D. Jordan, Book of Surveying Exercises and Notes on Property and Estate Lw
(1845) (unpublished journal) (on file with the Arthur W. Diamond Law Library); see S.
JOURNAL, 64th Sess. 302 (N.Y. 1861) (noting Jordan becoming a justice of the peace). In
addition to math problems, Justice Jordan’s other major project in his exercise book was an
alphabetical list of legal terms and their definitions collected from various reference books,
though he only made it to the letter “P.” Jordan, supra.
107 A Partner Wanted, GREENLEAF’S N.Y. J., & PATRIOTIC REG., May 26, 1798, at 4.
108 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Partnership Form of Organization: Its Popularity in EarlyNineteenth-Century Boston, in ENTREPRENEURS: THE BOSTON BUSINESS COMMUNITY, 1700–
1850, at 269, 269–95 (Conrad Edick Wright & Katheryn P. Viens eds., 1997).
109 See id. at 287–88.
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another 1798 ad offered “a very Lucrative and Genteel Business” to
any young man with three hundred to five hundred dollars at the
ready. 110 Even where new partners committed substantial sums,
though, “partner wanted” ads shared the page with ads for clerks,
journeymen, and apprentices, suggesting that these “situations,” as
job-seekers might call them, 111 were different more in degree than in
kind. Aspiring partners might settle for employment, at least
temporarily.
Gratuities, commissions, profit-splitting, and investment
alongside salary: all these variations linked a junior’s compensation to
the earnings of the enterprise. In doing so, they elevated rising young
men away from the wage labor fate they feared and helped proprietors
avoid the fixed expense of promised regular pay. But would these
arrangements raise legal complications? In the eighteenth century,
the answer was generally no. If a small business’s participants were
unlucky enough to be caught up in a dispute that might raise the issue,
the outcome would likely be determined through local legal processes,
without recourse to commercial law. But by the nineteenth century,
the question had become a trickier one as American small business
began to confront a new commercial world and its legal demands.
B. The Mercantile Law of Contracts for Partnership
While early Americans within local economies united their labor
in small shops, farms, and workshops, a cadre of merchants in the
Anglo-Atlantic world joined forces under an entirely different set of
legal rules. They benefitted from eighteenth-century England’s innovative golden age of commercial law development, spearheaded by the
Court of King’s Bench’s Lord Mansfield. 112 Mansfield served an
extraordinarily long and influential term of over thirty years,
beginning in 1756. 113 Under his guidance, the court attuned itself to
the customs of the merchants who had recently elevated England to a
newly powerful stature in world trade, through a robust commerce
with England’s own colonies and others. 114 The court then reconciled
and incorporated those customs into the language of common law
itself, providing new clarity and specificity on topics including
contracts, insurance, bankruptcy, financial instruments, and more. 115
A Partner Wanted, N.Y. GAZETTE & GEN. ADVERTISER, Jan. 2, 1798.
See, e.g., Situation, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1830).
On Mansfield, see generally NORMAN S. POSER, LORD MANSFIELD: JUSTICE IN THE
AGE OF REASON (2013); JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD
3–11 (2004).
113 OLDHAM, supra note 112, at xi, 3–11.
114 See id.
115 See id.
110
111
112

2022]

CONTRACT’S COVERT MEDDLERS

1291

The work of Mansfield and the King’s Bench coincided with an
unprecedented boom in treatises and other legal literature: in greater
and greater numbers, legal writers strove to summarize and sort
caselaw to render it coherent and easily applied. 116 The target of all
this activity, when it came to commercial law topics, was both
exceptionally important and relatively narrow within the broader
English and American social context; Mansfield and his peers were
writing law for an emerging transnational class of merchants. That
certainly included Americans, who continued to cite English
commercial cases and treat them as authoritative well into the
nineteenth century and beyond. 117 The law of contracts for partnership belongs to this development. Merchants’ partnership disputes
received significant attention from the King’s Bench under
Mansfield. 118 In American courts, early cases often covered the same
mercantile terrain, resolving partnership disputes over transatlantic
voyages, imported whale oil, and cross-country timber shipments. 119
Despite the limited scope of the kinds of businesses they meant to
address, English and American treatise writers still wrestled to establish
when merchants were partners and when they were mere
collaborators. One merchant might sell to another, might pay him for
assistance with transport, might rely on him to communicate with
distant trade networks, and more. 120 How could a legal observer
determine whether they had legally become partners? Most obviously,
they could formally contract to be partners, often making use of a
standard printed form that would, in theory, remove all controversy.
For instance, an 1802 London form book offered for copying the
agreement of four partners to collaborate to import goods from
“beyond the seas”: the agreement left no doubt that all four were

116 A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms
of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 636 (1981).
117 Consider, for example, leading legal periodical The American Jurist. Its section
digesting recent significant cases gave equal attention to English cases and American ones.
See, e.g., Digest of English Cases, 27 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 192, 192–203 (1842); Digest of
American Cases, 27 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 203, 203–37 (1842).
118 See, e.g., Fox v. Hanbury (1776) 98 Eng. Rep. 1179; 2 Cowp. 445; Jestons v. Brooke
(1778) 98 Eng. Rep. 1365; 2 Cowp. 793; see also WILLIAM WATSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF PARTNERSHIP 192–200, 278–286 (London, A. Straham & W. Woodfall 1794).
119 See, e.g., Baxter v. Rodman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 435 (1826); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass.
(17 Tyng) 197 (1821); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, AS A
BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE, WITH OCCASIONAL
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW 61–74 (2d ed. 1846) (discussing Baxter
and Rice).
120 JOSHUA MONTEFIORE, COMMERCIAL AND NOTARIAL PRECEDENTS: CONSISTING OF
ALL THE MOST APPROVED FORMS, SPECIAL AND COMMON, WHICH ARE REQUIRED IN
TRANSACTIONS OF BUSINESS 251–261 (London, R. Phillips 1802).
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partners, including the two deputized to manage the enterprise’s
affairs on the ground in England and abroad. 121
Once they were partners, the fates of two traders were significantly
linked, particularly in case of commercial misfortune. Both partners
could equally draw on the partnership’s credit and resources in the
course of business for the enterprise. And, if business failed, creditors
could pursue both the partnership’s assets and the personal resources
of each partner. 122 Savvy partners could create variations on this
structure. Contractual provisions might change the partners’ profit
split: say, 70–30 instead of 50–50. 123 Partners might also limit when and
how one or both partners could take certain actions on behalf of the
partnership. 124
Even if two traders did not intend to become partners, though, if
they merely “h[e]ld[] [them]sel[ves] out” as partners—that is, if they
each signed on behalf of the partnership without qualification or
otherwise made themselves appear to be partners—that could make
them into partners too, at least when it came to others who had done
business with what they thought was a partnership. 125 But those trading
with merchants had to watch the paperwork carefully and understand
the norms of the market to know whether their perceptions of
partnership would be legally recognized. One commonly cited 1780
case found that, in a complex transaction involving sales of East India
tea, a now-bankrupt broker had acted only for himself and not as
partner to any of the dealers he supplied. 126 Disappointed banker
creditors claimed they had understood the collaboration as a
partnership, but witnesses familiar with such dealings testified that all
should have understood that “the money was lent to the broker
alone.”127
Certain financial arrangements could also create a partnership,
even if the putative partners did not intend one. Specifically, if they
agreed to split the profits of their enterprise, they would likely be

121 Id. at 251–52.
122 GEORGE CAINES, 1 AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LAW MERCHANT OF THE UNITED STATES;
OR, LEX MERCATORIA AMERICANA, ON SEVERAL HEADS OF COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE 420
(New York, Isaac Collins & Son 1802).
123 See id. at 422.
124 Id. at 423.
125 Id. at 424.
126 Hoare v. Dawes (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 239, 240; 1 Dougl. 371, 372; see also POINTS IN
LAW AND EQUITY, SELECTED FOR THE INFORMATION, CAUTION, AND DIRECTION, OF ALL
PERSONS CONCERNED IN TRADE AND COMMERCE; WITH REFERENCES TO THE STATUTES,
REPORTS, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES, UPON WHICH THEY ARE FOUNDED 159 (London, A.
Strahan & W. Woodfall 1792).
127 Hoare, 99 Eng. Rep. at 240.
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partners. 128 The foundational, and later controversial, 1775 English
case Grace v. Smith established the parameters of this rule, by
determining whether two former partners who entered into a loan had
inadvertently created a new partnership in doing so. 129 Traders Smith
and Robinson split up after only months of partnership. Robinson
agreed to buy out Smith’s share in the business, but to enable him to
do so Smith loaned Robinson a substantial sum at five percent interest
plus a fixed annuity. Robinson’s solo efforts led to bankruptcy, and his
creditors sought out Smith. Chief Justice De Grey began his analysis
with the rule that would govern such cases, “[e]very man who has a
share of the profits . . . ought also to bear his share of the loss.” 130 In
other words, if Smith stood to take a share should the enterprise
experience success, then he should equally owe creditors in case of
failure. But De Grey determined that Smith’s interest on the loan he
made was different from a share of the profits. Although Robinson
would necessarily pay Smith by using some of the profits he was
making, that was different from a share “payable out of the profits”
themselves. 131 Against the possible argument that such a distinction
was too difficult to apply, De Grey defended it “not more nice than
usually occurs in . . . trade or usury.”132
The profits rule was not only a matter of labeling. For legal
thinkers of the time, it had moral weight. As the King’s Bench
explained in Waugh v. Carver, a subsequent case affirming the
principle, a share of profits had to come with the burden of liability
because “by taking a part of the profits, [a putative partner] takes from
the creditors a part of that fund which is the proper security to them
for the payment of their debts.” 133 It seemed to the judges a matter of
fairness that all profit sharers had to “stand in a just situation with
regard to the creditors of the house.” 134
It was not only lending and investment that could lead to
inadvertent partnership via profit sharing—and now and then,
somewhat less elite participants in the market might be found partners
too, if convenient to third-party interests. Waugh, building on Grace v.
Smith, addressed the case of ship agents who each agreed to confine
their business offerings to different territories, and in compensation to
offer each other a share of the profits they earned. 135 Holding for the
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

See CAINES, supra note 122, at 420.
Grace v. Smith (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 587, 588; 2 Black. W. 998, 1000–01.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Waugh v. Carver (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 525, 525; 2 H. Bl. 235, 235.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 525.
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agents’ creditors, the court found them responsible for each other’s
debts, even though they had specifically contracted to avoid such
liability. 136 An insistent attorney argued that agents, who served merchants in their transactions, were not themselves “traders” and could
not therefore be partners—just as fishermen or artisans teaming up
would not be considered participants in this formal mercantile
relationship. 137 Still, the justices found these agents close enough. On
the other hand the law excluded the commercial world’s lowliest
members, the seamen who staffed its ships, from potential partnership.
Even though seamen were traditionally paid a percentage of the profits
of each voyage upon arrival, a recognized customary exception held
that this could not make them partners. Affirming this older rule, an
1826 Massachusetts case explained that if seamen were partners as a
result of ships’ pay structure, it would be “exceedingly inconvenient,
and would, no doubt, entirely break up the peculiar mode of
conducting these voyages.” 138
The settled formal law of partnership, as Anglo-American legal
writers described it, was designed around the priorities of its
mercantile participants. 139 It differentiated partners from merely
collaborating traders or agents based on their financial participation
in the venture, and it understood which exceptions, like those of
seamen, had already become accepted and understood.
III.

CLASH OF TWO LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

As American legal thinkers tried to integrate small business into
the rules of mercantile law, they faced a clash of background rules.
Mercantile law, thanks to the careful work of Lord Mansfield and the
King’s Bench, had incorporated and streamlined the expectations of a
small but economically important group of merchants mainly carrying
out lucrative colonial trade and related ventures. Meanwhile,
American local courts evaluated business relationships with the
awareness that the amount and type of labor that a person performed
within a business often served to define his role.
Within these two systems, partnership represented two different
concepts. Under mercantile law and merchant practice, a partnership
either existed or it didn’t, based on the enterprise’s financial
structure—and the difference was vital for evaluating the risk and
136 Id. at 532.
137 Id. at 531.
138 Baxter v. Rodman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 435, 438 (1826).
139 These developments are often attributed to the influence of Lord Mansfield, Chief
Justice of the Court of King’s Bench from 1756–1788. See OLDHAM, supra note 112, at 79–
208.
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consequences of failure in the context of high-value yet perilous
transactions at the mercy of fickle seas and changing financial currents.
Under small-business norms, which made their way into local
adjudications, partnership was a basket of possible rights and
responsibilities—entitlement to business assets, control and autonomy
in operating it, reputation within the community, liability for failure,
and more—and it would take real inquiry into the circumstances to
understand what combination had been at play within the enterprise
at issue at the moment in question.
Those two systems clashed as markets became more integrated.
When more sophisticated merchants loaned money to, sold on credit
to, and invested in small businesses, they expected their own norms to
control. Equally, small businesses did not anticipate that transacting
with new kinds of business associates would alter the meaning of the
agreements they had made within their own enterprises. The crux of
the question was this: In an early American business, a junior
collaborator and worker in a business might receive a share of profits
as his payment, might invest in the enterprise, and might gain more
autonomy and control within the business as he continued to work, all
without formalizing his role relative to his more senior collaborator.
Was the junior liable for the business’s debts? Local courts had ways
to resolve this question without resorting to analogy with mercantile
law. Though evidence of their practices survives only piecemeal, it
appears that local courts often placed less emphasis on an enterprise’s
financial structure and more on the ways that each participant’s labor
for the business and behavior within the community suggested which
responsibilities and rights he had taken on.
Courts had a variety of options for resolving this clash of norms.
They might have privileged the assumptions and understandings that
structured small businesses, requiring creditors and investors who
placed low-value sums in the hands of small businesses to understand
those enterprises on their own terms. Instead, high courts stuck with
what they knew, imposing Lord Mansfield’s rules on the small
businesses newly crowding their dockets. Siding with third-party
creditors, legal thinkers adopted commercial law’s narrower vision of
what kinds of relationships would be formed and how they would be
interpreted. In any given case, a junior business member was either a
partner and therefore liable, or not a partner and therefore free from
liability—but also therefore stripped of the special, elevated role within
the business that local partnership rules had implied.
In drawing the distinction, legal thinkers first tried to craft a
bright-line test, in which partnership would follow automatically from
a firm’s financial set-up and on-paper structure, matching the analogous rule that differentiated partnership from other relationships
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within merchant businesses. But as cases accumulated, legal thinkers
observed the surprising and unfair outcomes that this rule could
create, imposing devastating liability on members of small businesses
who, even if they were “partners,” clearly had not expected such an
outcome. Gradually, they retreated from the firmest version of the
rule, settling instead on the idea that a worker who received payment
in the form of profits was something different from a partner—though
where the boundary lay between a partner contributing labor and a
worker paid in profits remained in dispute. To justify unexpected
outcomes for small businesses, courts and legal thinkers increasingly
began to blame them for setting up these structures in the first place.
Small businesses ought to have known their responsibility to conform
with commercial law, and if they had failed to do so, they deserved
their fate. Legal handbooks and magazines therefore urged businessmen to educate themselves in the forms courts expected and to set up
their businesses accordingly.
A. Enabling Local Difference
One way for an appellate court to resolve the conflict in a case
where local legal norms clashed with mercantile expectations would
have been to ignore it—that is, to treat its resolution as relatively
unimportant from the perspective of commercial doctrine, guided
mainly by factual inquiry conducted below in accordance with
localized norms, with little room for more sophisticated legal input.
Appellate courts were certainly interested in the high-stakes
partnership disputes of merchants debating the boundaries of their
responsibility for expensive transactions: but when it came to a smalltown general store, for example, there was not necessarily any need to
ensure this little enterprise matched those legal arrangements.
That was the approach that higher courts seem to have taken
around the turn of the nineteenth century. As these courts began to
record in writing the cases they thought were legally significant, they
hardly ever included cases of disputed partnership involving low-level,
ordinary businesses. To the extent that such cases were appealed to
high courts in the first place (likely relatively rarely), court reporters
did not believe they embodied legal principles worth preserving.140
In Drake v. Elwyn, an 1804 New York case, however, court reporter
George Caines made the unusual choice to preserve a dispute over
ownership of a small family-run store. 141 Caines, who authored the
pioneering treatise Lex Mercatoria Americana about a year earlier, was
140 On early court reporters’ practices and decisionmaking in preserving cases heard
in courts, see Winsberg, supra note 32, at 15.
141 Drake v. Elwyn, 1 Cai. 184, 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
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especially interested in identifying a truly American, as opposed to
English, commercial law. 142 His assigned post as court reporter of New
York’s intermediate appellate “supreme” courts, moreover, likely
exposed him to more lower-value cases than did his alternate beat,
reporting cases from New York’s actually supreme Court of Errors. 143
Drake is therefore one of the earliest published cases in which
community partnership norms collided with creditor expectations.
Still, in resolving it, the court exemplified a hands-off approach to
local-level adjudication. In New York in 1800, the court found, John
Elwyn and father and son Peter and Samuel Wittaker together ran a
general store. 144 But who owned the store? This deceptively simple
question was not so easy, because Elwyn and the Wittakers, like many
small entrepreneurs of their era, had joined forces without formally
designating who was a partner in the business, and who worked for pay.
If all had gone well, the question might never have required definitive
resolution. It might also have been resolved in local court. But Elwyn
& Co.’s debts, and the insistence of their creditors Drake and Pinkney,
forced the issue. 145 If Elwyn and Co. owed money, that meant each of
the firm’s partners was personally liable for the debt. Elwyn admitted
he was a partner, and so did the younger Wittaker, Samuel, but both
were insolvent. 146 The question in Drake v. Elwyn, then, was the status
of the father, Peter. 147 The store’s creditors took the alleged partners
from justice court to the intermediate appellate New York Supreme
Court. At this early date, though, the appellate court remained
deferential to the community-centered, jury-driven approach of the
court below. 148
At trial, the evidence collected had focused squarely on the work
that each of the firm’s members had performed, and on how it would
have been perceived by the community. Peter had been in the store
as often as the other two men, witnesses reported, and one had seen
him draw spirits for a customer. 149 All three had traveled up the
Hudson to buy goods, and when asked if they were planning to keep
store, Peter had answered, “yes, we are going to try it.”150 Peter had
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

See CAINES, supra note 122, at 3.
See id.
Drake, 1 Cai. at 184.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See N.Y. STATE CT. OF APPEALS & N.Y. STATE ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., “DUELY &

CONSTANTLY KEPT”: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, 1691–1847 AND AN
INVENTORY OF ITS RECORDS (ALBANY, UTICA, AND GENEVA OFFICES), 1797–1847, at 20–21
(1991).
149 Drake, 1 Cai. at 184.
150 Id.
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collected payment from customers, too. 151 Yet Peter was very old and
illiterate; perhaps he merely assisted the other two. 152 On the other
hand, some people thought it was Peter and Elwyn who owned the
store, while young Samuel was merely a clerk. 153 Adding to the
difficulties, the business had not apparently gone by a single consistent
name that might indicate its proprietors. 154
As it considered the record, the New York Supreme Court
affirmed this community-centered course inquiry, in an opinion by a
young James Kent. 155 The evidence was enough to suggest there might
be such a firm as “Elwyn & Co.”; from there, “of course it belonged to
the jury” to consider whom it comprised. 156 Luckily for the creditors,
the jury had sided with them: it found both father and son had been
partners and were liable for the store’s debts. 157
Despite their victory, Drake and Pinkney, and other potential
creditors of small firms like this one, might not be entirely satisfied
with the case’s outcome. Under Drake v. Elwyn, there was no easy way
for a creditor to know who within an informally organized small
business would likely be liable for its debts. Partners could be
distinguished from clerks in how they spoke about the business, in
what kinds of tasks they took on, and in how they compared in status
and skills. Because it depended on circumstance, partnership could
also shift over time: for example, had the business lived longer, father
Peter might have aged out of partnership as his son gained more
experience and authority. A neighbor could glean this kind of information, but a more distant lender or supplier on credit would be less
likely up to speed. 158 Indeed, in subsequent decades, local courts’
community-centered examination of the relationships involved would
be received rather differently by appellate courts. Creditor-litigants
like Drake and Pinkney urged appellate courts to exert more control—
and to adjudicate cases that matched their expectations, often at the
expectations of either community members or of the contractors
themselves.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id. at 184.
See BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS & STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY
CONNECTICUT (G. Edward White ed.,1987). Unfortunately, the record reveals little about
creditors Drake and Pinkney. Drake, 1 Cai. at 184. A general store’s creditors might
commonly include its suppliers, who typically provided goods on credit, or those who had
invested capital in the business. But whether, here, Drake and Pinkney did so more as
community members or as more sophisticated merchants remains uncertain.
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
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But even as creditors encouraged higher courts to crack down on
local legal norms, many American voters held the opposite view. In
New York and several other states, legislators enlarged justice courts’
jurisdiction by raising the maximum monetary threshold of the cases
they heard, gaining popular acclaim from voters who resented their
encounters with commercial law’s assumptions in higher courts. 159
The boundaries of two previously mostly separate legal domains were
in flux, and across the legal system, courts, legal thinkers, and litigants
alike were still working out what would happen when they overlapped.
B. Commercial Law’s Takeover
As the nineteenth century went on, sophisticated commercial
men were increasingly likely to do business with smaller enterprises
operating according to different norms. The first half of the
nineteenth century was the scene of America’s “first industrial
revolution,” a transformation in how Americans worked, produced,
bought, and sold that nonetheless little resembled the railroad and
factory-centered growth that would come later in the century. 160
Though a few large-scale enterprises anticipated larger patterns, the
vast majority of production still occurred in small settings: farms,
workshops, and stores in which one or two proprietors worked
alongside a small number of hired or bound workers. 161 Still, the
context of that work, and the relationships it produced, were changing
and becoming more commercial. Farmers, artisans, small storekeepers, and others became more closely linked with larger markets. 162
That meant they would encounter merchants, especially creditors, who
wanted them to conform to the same legal rules they employed with
one another.
Could commercial law apply to small enterprises quite different
from the litigants whose cases had produced these doctrines?
Creditors began to argue in court that it could and should apply. Many
American legal treatise writers thought so too, and they were eager to
take up the project of showing how it could be done. They believed
that the American economy’s rapid growth would be limited if so many
Americans were allowed to continue resolving disputes outside the

159 Kim, supra note 51, at 390–460.
160 LICHT, supra note 102, at 129.
161 Id.
162 See CHRISTOPHER CLARK, THE ROOTS OF RURAL CAPITALISM: WESTERN
MASSACHUSETTS, 1780–1860 (1990); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION:
JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815–1846 (1991); JONATHAN PRUDE, THE COMING OF INDUSTRIAL
ORDER: TOWN AND FACTORY LIFE IN RURAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1810–1860 (1983); LICHT, supra
note 102.
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bounds of formal law. 163 As Vermont legal writer Daniel Chipman
explained in 1822, while “the plain principles of the natural law” might
have sufficed in an uncomplicated early society, the United States’
recent “advances in wealth and refinement” demanded “settled and
uniform administration of justice.” 164 Whereas earlier writers, like
Caines, had described the law regulating primarily the disputes of the
wealthiest and most commercially sophisticated, this new generation
of legal writers aimed to document and regularize case outcomes
involving more ordinary litigants. American legal writers aimed to
explain, and in doing so regularize, relationships of labor, profit, and
investment outside the realm of transatlantic trade.
As legal writers took up the new project of regularizing an
expanded commercial world, their attention to the contractual topics
once vital to towns—indenture, apprenticeship, and other long-term
labor relationships—waned. One reason was that long-term labor
contracts were in steady decline: increasingly, they did not appear
viable as a complete solution for towns’ poor relief problem, which
would have to be addressed in other ways outside the realm of contract
doctrine. 165 Another was that officials and observers, like legal writers,
began to see economic growth as a desirable social goal. Intellectual
historians have found that whereas early modern thinkers had often
focused on shepherding full and appropriate use of a fixed pot of
resources, nineteenth-century thinkers saw expanded possibilities,
alongside novel dangers, imagining for the first time an economy that
could boundlessly expand and grow. 166 That gave creditors’ logic in
arguing for a new and bigger commercial world a new weight.
New concepts of the economy spurred reinterpretations of the
transactional behaviors of early Americans. James Kent wrote in 1828,
“[p]artnerships have grown with the growth, and multiplied with the
extension of trade.” 167 What did Kent mean by the “extension of
trade”? He meant, in part, that the nation’s economy was growing by
any measure. But he was also describing, and perhaps advocating for,
a change in Americans’ understanding of which activities counted as
163 Formal law’s encroachment on local justice is described, from the perspective of the
justice courts, in EDWARDS, supra note 51. On the rise of American legal doctrine as a form
of empire-building, see DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830 (2005).
164 DANIEL CHIPMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: FOR THE PAYMENT OF
SPECIFICK ARTICLES v, xi (Middlebury, Vt., Daniel Chipman 1822).
165 See Holly Brewer, Apprenticeship Policy in Virginia: From Patriarchal to Republican
Policies of Social Welfare, in CHILDREN BOUND TO LABOR: THE PAUPER APPRENTICE SYSTEM IN
EARLY AMERICA 183, 184 (Ruth Wallis Herndon & John E. Murray eds., 2009).
166 See, e.g., JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN
VISION OF THE 1790S 25–51 (1984).
167 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (New York, O. Halsted 1828).
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“trade”: small-scale farming and crafts and their local-level
distribution, long conducted in informal economies of barter and
credit, could now be understood as part of the nation’s commercial
life, too, alongside the more sophisticated activities of coastal shippers
and merchants. Kent explained, “[i]t is not essential to a legal
partnership, that it be confined to commercial business. It may exist
between attorneys, conveyancers, mechanics, artisans, or farmers; as
well as between merchants and bankers.”168 Expanded application of
older partnership principles would make things easier for merchants
and bankers trying to determine the potential liability of artisans and
farmers. But it was not without controversy: the 1830 American editor
of an English treatise noted two American cases in which parties raised
the question whether attorneys were really “traders” subject to the
mercantile law of partnership. 169 As a party in one of these cases had
argued, the rule requiring special procedures between partners “ought
not to be extended to cases other than those relating to trade and
commerce.”170 However, the argument failed, and by 1837, the same
editor had added an additional case from the same court affirming that
attorney partners were no different from their financier
counterparts. 171
Creditors of small businesses were gaining traction in their effort
to recover against parties involved with those businesses according to
the rules of mercantile law. Yet as courts and legal writers attempted
to use the existing law of partnership contracts to regulate liability
within an emerging world of commercialized small enterprise, they
encountered a local understanding of partnership that was often at
odds with the mercantile-inspired doctrine they were trying to apply.
Legal thinkers of the period hoped to describe rules for the entire
commercial world as they saw it, at least when it came to questions of
liability. The question was how they would incorporate the messy and
experimental world of early American small business.

168 Id. at 6.
169 See NIEL GOW, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 6 n.1 (Edward D.
Ingraham ed., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small, 2d Am. ed. 1830) (1825) (first citing Westerlo
v. Evertson, 1 Wend. 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828); and then citing Marsh v. Gold, 19 Mass. (2
Pick.) 285 (1824)).
170 Westerlo, 1 Wend. At 533.
171 See NIEL GOW, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP: WITH AN
APPENDIX OF PRECEDENTS 6 n.1 (Edward D. Ingraham ed., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small,
3d American ed. 1837) (1825) (citing Warner v. Griswold, 8 Wend. 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1832)).
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C. A Bright-Line Test
If small-town grocery stores were legally just like East India traders,
and if their workers were no different from other kinds of entities that
might interact with a business, then the rules established by Lord
Mansfield and his London contemporaries could be easily applied.
Grace v. Smith had held that “[e]very man who has a share of the
profits . . . ought also to bear his share of the loss.” 172 In other words,
a payment taking the form of a share of the profits would be assumed
to imply full liability on the part of the recipient for losses, too. A
“lender” who took his payment in the form of a percentage of the
profits rather than repayment plus interest had in fact taken on the
financial relationship of an investor; under Grace v. Smith fellow
merchants interested in the enterprise could expect that purported
lender to be on the hook as partner. 173 That assumption—that profit
sharing produced partnership—was an interpretive norm produced
within the elite transatlantic mercantile context which allowed thirdparty potential investors and lenders to understand whose wealth and
reputation were on the line within the enterprise. 174 Shared norms, in
turn, meant that contracting parties themselves took on obligations
voluntarily. As an early American expounder of mercantile partnership law put it, “free will is the very essence of partnership.” 175
By analogy, anyone working within an enterprise who received his
pay in the form of a percentage of the profits had been transformed,
just as thoroughly, into a partner by virtue of that relationship. Yet
upon closer inspection, the commercial law analogy had certain flaws
in the context of small business labor relationships. Cases like Grace v.
Smith, including similar mercantile adjudications in American courts,
attempted to distinguish those intimately involved in a trading venture
from those merely peripherally involved. 176 But in cases of American
small enterprise, everyone agreed that the people involved had gone
into business together. Rather, the question was who held the power
(and therefore legal rights and responsibilities) within the

172 Grace v. Smith (1795) 96 Eng. Rep. 587, 588; 2 Black. W. 998, 1000–01.
173 Id.
174 The rule also reflected a policy mandate within common law reserving limited
liability—the ability to invest in an enterprise without putting one’s own wealth at risk—for
enterprises receiving the blessing of incorporation, or, later on, limited partnership. I
explore the lasting effects of partnership doctrine produced in the context of scarce and
closely-guarded limited liability within present-day work law in Sarah Winsberg, Liability
and its Limits in the History of the Gig Economy (July 15, 2021) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
175 CAINES, supra note 122, at 420.
176 The leading case was Dob v. Halsey, 16 Johns. 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
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relationship. 177 Still, throughout the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, many
courts and legal thinkers insisted on following the logic of this analogy
without exception—pay out of the profits means third parties can
expect partnership—despite its flaws. They did so at the behest of
creditor litigants, prioritizing creditors’ expectations over others, and
critiquing or reinterpreting the relationship-centered logic of lower
courts.
Judges and legal thinkers adopted creditors’ logic in part because
it was so neat. In the view of one author, the law of partnership as
developed by Lord Mansfield and his compatriots exemplified
“comparative perfection and comprehensive character and
enlightened liberality.” 178 Maintaining that perfection while applying
partnership law to such different business contexts would be difficult.
Creditors’ suggestions offered an easy way around the complexity.
The New Hampshire Superior Court took precisely this brightline approach in Brown v. Cook in 1824, finding for creditor Benjamin
Brown against an assistant in cattle sales. 179 There, the court declared,
“[n]othing can be clearer” than that two men who “share between
them the profits of the business indefinitely” would always be
considered partners. 180 The facts of the case, however, had been
murkier than that language implied. Indeed, for the lower court, the
outcome had been heavily fact driven. The creditor who initiated the
case, Benjamin Brown, claimed the proceeds of the sale of two of his
oxen. Brown had hired another man, Cook, to take Brown’s oxen to
market and sell it. 181 Cook, in turn, had delegated the task to an
associate of his, Robbins. Robbins sold the oxen and collected the
proceeds—but neither Cook nor Robbins ever turned them over to
Brown. Brown sued both men, and the question was whether he could
recover from both as partners, or whether, as Robbins and Cook
claimed, Cook was simply Robbins’s agent. 182 To find the answer, the
lower court had heard “much evidence” on either side. 183 Cook
claimed his role in simply “collecting cattle” was not enough for
partnership: the real solo work was Robbins’s in driving them to
market, generally a long and arduous journey from inland farm to
coastal market. 184 In the end, a jury nonetheless found that the two

177

See, e.g., supra notes 149–57.
STORY, supra note 119, at vii.
Brown v. Cook, 3 N.H. 64, 64 (1824).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id. On the trials of cattle’s journey to market in New England and beyond, see
BERNARD BAILYN, THE NEW ENGLAND MERCHANTS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 95
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
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were partners. But in the hands of the New Hampshire Superior
Court, their painstaking inquiry had become simple and obvious,
driven by a single element of the relationship.
Pennsylvania’s Purviance v. McClintee, in 1820, appears to
represent a similar transformation in logic from trial to appeal. Like
Brown, Purviance rigorously enforced Grace v. Smith’s rule in spite of
evidence that the parties had meant to create a different kind of
relationship, using abstract formal legal logic to affirm a lower court
verdict likely guided by more humanitarian motives. 185 Young Samuel
Dryden Jr. had agreed to manage a general store in Ohio, funded by
Pennsylvania merchant Samuel Purviance, and to split the store’s
profits. 186 When the store foundered, Dryden Jr. borrowed a significant sum from his father. Although evidence to this effect was not
allowed to be introduced, Dryden claimed he had given his father’s
money straight to Purviance, who used it to pay personal debts that
Purviance had incurred before their joint venture. 187 Dryden’s father
died shortly afterward, and his estate tried to recover the loan from
Purviance, claiming that the money had been loaned to both
Purviance and Dryden Jr. as partners. Purviance objected: Dryden Jr.,
he argued, was only a clerk, and the loan, or maybe gift, was an issue
between father and son. 188
Here, it was the more senior of the pair who had tried to evade
liability, and the lower court had refused to let him do it. Although
the Court of Common Pleas had invoked the profits rule, Purviance’s
dubious behavior—seeking out the money of a vulnerable junior’s
parent and then denying responsibility—likely had much to do with
the case’s outcome before the jury. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
by contrast, aimed to make a broader statement about the relationship
between a small enterprise and its creditors. Chief Justice Tilghman
declared that “creditors should not be deprived of that fund to which
they looked for payment” based on the “secret agreements of
merchants.” 189 Those “secret agreements,” of course, would be
Dryden and Purviance’s own understanding of the enterprise they had
created—but to Chief Justice Tilghman, such understandings needed
to be easily legible to a third-party creditor or they could not be
upheld.

(1955); CHRISTOPHER KNOWLTON, CATTLE KINGDOM: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
COWBOY WEST 17 (2017).
185 Purviance v. McClintee, 6 Serg. & Rawle 259, 261 (Pa. 1820).
186 Id. at 259–60.
187 Purviance v. Dryden, 3 Serg. & Rawle 402, 403 (Pa. 1817).
188 McClintee, 6 Serg. & Rawle at 259.
189 Id. at 261.
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Some legal thinkers advanced a modified bright-line approach,
also borrowed from English courts, that distinguished gross profits
from net profits. 190 If an enterprise member received a share of its
earnings before subtracting expenses, that could be understood as just
a commission on sales, no partnership implied. By contrast, if he got
a share of the profits after expenses, that setup looked more like a
dividend, which indicated partnership and therefore liability for debts.
Other thinkers felt that even this modification bent too far in the
direction of acknowledging contractors’ own intentions, and in
consequence did not sufficiently protect creditors. Justice Gibson of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, examining the liability of a grocery
store clerk to a creditor of the store, declared that where payment from
profits occurs, “it is of no importance that a contract of partnership
was not intended.” 191 Indeed, it seems especially unlikely that this
particular grocery clerk and grocery manager had intended a
partnership because the clerk’s profits share had been a mere seven
percent of the total, a bonus on top of the yearly salary he would also
receive. 192 But to Gibson, “public policy” demanded rigorous enforcement of bright lines around partnership; he found it “particularly
strange that [the rule] should have been relaxed in cases like the
present.” 193 It was only Gibson’s reverence for English commercial law
that led him to reluctantly embrace the gross profits/net profits
distinction: given the international nature of merchants’ dealings, he
opined, “we are bound by the decisions of foreign courts on
commercial questions, as firmly as we are by our own.”194 English
mercantile law would govern the dealings of this little Philadelphia
grocery, whatever the intentions of its actual participants. Only a quirk
in commercial doctrine had saved the grocery clerk from unexpected
liability for all of the store’s debts.
D. Beyond the Bright-Line Test
Examining this state of affairs, in which many judges were
prepared to impose partnership against the intentions of the parties
themselves, some legal thinkers balked. As one writer wondered in
frustration, “Why should the creditor’s contract displace the contract
of the immediate parties?” 195 These writers worried that prioritizing
creditors’ expectations over parties’ own intentions undermined the
190
191
192
193
194
195

See, e.g., Ex parte Hamper (1811) 34 Eng. Rep. 156, 159; 17 Ves. Jun. 403, 412.
Miller v. Bartlet, 15 Serg. & Rawle 137, 139 (Pa. 1827).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
STORY, supra note 119, at 56 n.2.
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contractarian principles to which commercial law purportedly
committed itself. At the same time, though, legal writers, perhaps even
more than judges, were excited to take on the project of expanding
commercial law to fit a wider range of cases, including those that would
previously have been settled according to local legal norms. Legal
writers therefore wrestled with the clash in values that this
juxtaposition created.
Exemplifying this tension was the work of Joseph Story, Supreme
Court Justice and towering legal writer of the era. 196 Story’s series of
“commentaries” in the 1830s and ’40s, modeled on the English text
Blackstone’s Commentaries, emerged as standard references to be
studied, abridged, and improved by others. 197 When Story took on
partnership, in 1841, his title reflected his understanding of the
subject: Story would cover “[p]artnership[] as a Branch of Commercial
and Maritime Jurisprudence,” tracing its lineage directly to the English
commercial law developments of the previous century and beyond. 198
Story was largely happy with partnership doctrine as it had developed
in England: he praised its “comparative perfection and comprehensive
character and enlightened liberality,” which, he believed, resulted
mainly from the “learned labors of the English Bar and Bench.”199
American legal effort, too, had “contributed its own share towards
expounding and enlarging them, so as to meet the new exigencies and
progressive enterprises of a widely extended international
commerce.”200 But it was precisely that extension to the local economies of the nineteenth-century United States that created disruptions
in a previously self-contained and coherent system, casting doubt on
the partnership ideal that “[t]he essence of the contract of
partnership . . . consist[s] in consent.”201
Involuntary partnership worried Story, who was preoccupied with
a particular kind of “predicament”: a young man would take up a
position assisting a more established businessman, to be paid based on
the business’s profits, either instead of a salary or in addition. 202
Suddenly, the business would find itself bankrupt, and hungry
creditors would pursue not only the risk-taking merchant, but the
hapless young clerk as well. 203 If anyone who paid a percentage of the

196 See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBLIC 193 (1985).
197 Id.
198 STORY, supra note 119, at i, vii.
199 Id. at vii.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 11.
202 See id. at 58.
203 See id. at 46–59.
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profits was automatically a partner, creditors would win against the
clerk. Even a more nuanced rule, distinguishing a commission on sales
or gross profits from a share of net profits after expenses, would still
include as partner many juniors who had never expected such liability.
Story asked, in an outraged footnote, why a clerk should be responsible
to creditors, when the parties had not intended it, and when he “has
trusted to his personal security, and only had a general confidence,
that he was doing a profitable business.” 204 Story advocated a blanket
exception for those whose share of profits was “mere compensation for
labor and services.” 205 The alternative, he argued, “must always carry
in its train serious mischiefs, or ruinous results, never contemplated by
the parties.” 206 A subsequent editor added, “Perhaps there is no other
instance in commercial law, where so many confessedly harsh decisions
have been based on so obvious a fallacy.”207
Story and his editor must have been thinking of cases like that of
poor John Feltz, in the rural Laurens district of South Carolina. 208 In
1817, Feltz had joined forces with William Simpson, a more established
merchant, to found a store. Feltz would manage the store and sell its
goods, mostly on credit, in exchange for a third of the profits once
customers paid up. 209 What was the relationship between Feltz and
Simpson? For nineteen months after Feltz and Simpson first went into
business together, there was no need to establish the difference. Feltz
lived off the cash he collected, and kept careful records of what
customers owed, in anticipation of splitting profits once they paid. 210
Unfortunately, the store burned down, taking with it much of the
stock, as well as most of the records. 211 All the store had earned were
the meager cash payments Feltz had lived on, and the store’s losses
from the fire likely nearly equaled those earnings. 212 Simpson, likely
anticipating the need to pay back the store’s creditors, sued to settle
up with Feltz. He demanded Feltz give the money back, with interest,
arguing that Feltz was a partner and therefore liable for the fire
losses. 213 A local chancery court sided with Feltz, viewing him “in no
Id. at 56 n.2.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, AS A BRANCH OF
COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE, WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE
CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW 62 n.3 (John C. Gray, Jr. ed., 6th ed. 1868).
208 See Simpson v. Feltz, 6 S.C. Eq. (1 McCord Eq.) 213, 213 (1826).
209 Id. at 213. Feltz kept store for “nineteen months” ending “the first of January
1819,” so he must have taken up in the position in 1817. Id. at 216, 215.
210 See id. at 213, 216.
211 Id. at 214.
212 Id. at 213–14, 219.
213 Id. at 217.
204
205
206
207
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other light than that of a hireling . . . . His being paid in meal or malt
did not vary his duties,” nor did Simpson’s actual choice to pay Feltz
“a share of the profits” in lieu of “standing wages.” 214 South Carolina’s
highest court disagreed, finding that Feltz’s pay out of the profits
necessarily made him a partner. 215 Refusing to consider that the
parties might have intended to give Feltz a percentage of the sales
realized, the judges instead found that sharing profits meant
partnership, and partnership meant equal liability for loss. “The
parties had all embarked their fortunes in one common concern,” the
court explained, so Feltz would have to pay up. 216 Indeed, under the
court’s ruling, if the store’s debts exceeded what it had made, Feltz
would be just as liable to creditors as Simpson.
The higher court’s ruling was in many ways understandable. Feltz
was no mere laborer: he worked with relative independence and had
significant responsibility for the fate of the business. An uncharitable
observer might even assign Feltz partial blame for the store fire: after
all, as the man on the ground, he had as much opportunity as anyone
to notice and remediate fire safety risks. Debt and failure were risks of
business, and from the court’s perspective, Feltz had taken them on as
much as Simpson had. On the other hand, Simpson’s superior position in the relationship was evident: Simpson chose and built the
store’s site, and he chose and supplied its products. Feltz was simply
executing Simpson’s vision. For an observer like Story, that was what
made his liability for losses unfair. 217
Story wished he could replace caselaw as it existed with a doctrine
that better prioritized the intent of purported partners. Under his
ideal rule, no partnership would ever be inferred “unless such were
the intention of the parties, or unless they had so held themselves out
to the public.” 218 Story even spoke admiringly of Roman law, which,
he explained “deemed all contracts to be made only between the
immediate parties thereto,” and did not legally acknowledge any
impacts on third parties without equitable intervention from the
214 Id. at 216.
215 Id. at 220.
216 Id.
217 Or, at least, it likely would have: Story avoided citing Simpson v. Feltz and several
similar prominent cases by name, even though they appeared in contemporary texts that
he consulted while writing his treatise, and even while critiquing this type of outcome
generally. For citations of Simpson elsewhere, see JOHN COLLYER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 8, 15, 50, 186 (O.L. Barbour ed., Springfield, Mass., G. & C.
Merriam, 2d American ed. 1839) (1832); GOW, supra note 169, at 12. Story extensively
referenced both Collyer’s treatise and Gow’s. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 119, at 29 n.2. By
criticizing the outcome of cases like Simpson without directly citing them, Story must have
hoped to marginalize them.
218 STORY, supra note 119, at 56.
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Praetor himself. 219 Constrained by caselaw as it existed, however, Story
was forced to acknowledge that “the common law has already settled it
otherwise; and therefore it is useless to speculate upon the subject.” 220
Still, Story endeavored to move closer to his intent-favoring
partnership ideal by carving out a labor exception to the general rule
that a share of profits would create partnership. He collected numerous cases that supported him in that view: grocery clerks, cattlepasturers, seamen, oyster-dredgers, constructors of turnpike roads,
textile workers, and others had all been found not partners even if
their earnings came in the form of profits. 221 In these instances,
according to Story, the purpose of sharing profits with the junior
business member was not to create partnership, but “to excite his
diligence, and secure his personal skill and exertions.” 222 Once this
distinction was clearly understood, Story felt, the problem of
involuntary partnership would largely dissipate. By separating true
partnership from enterprises where a share of profits functioned only
as a salary, he argued, partnership law could once again attain the ideal
state in which “the agreement and intention of the parties themselves
should govern all the cases.” 223
Though Story advocated for parties’ intent, however, he missed
the ways that even his most optimistic solutions in fact continued to
undermine intent in favor of third-party expectations. Like the colleagues he criticized, Story continued to assume that either parties
intended to create a relatively equal relationship of decisionmaking,
risk-sharing, and ownership, or they had meant to create a fully
unequal relationship of mere hiring. In Story’s world, a store manager
like Feltz would be free from the risk of unexpected liability—but he
would also be deprived of the status he had perhaps sought out in the
first place, which would have elevated him beyond mere employee.
Empowered by logic similar to Story’s, Massachusetts Justice
Samuel Hubbard, in 1845, was relieved to avoid imposing joint liability
in a case where he felt the contracting parties had not intended
partnership. He declared, “We are not then called upon, by any
stubborn rules of law, to create a relation between the parties which
was never intended, and thus turn an agent into a partner, for the
benefit of third parties whose interests are not affected by the mode of
payment.” 224

219
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221
222
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Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 61–74.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
Bradley v. White, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 303, 304–05 (1845).
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Following Story, subsequent legal writers increasingly accepted
the distinction he had embraced. Even more, they began to view that
distinction as obvious and easy to spot. But who, exactly, would be
doing the spotting? Story’s know-it-when-you-see-it approach, even as
it claimed to prioritize contracting parties’ intentions, nonetheless
implicitly privileged the expectations of a sophisticated creditor as to
how business would usually be done, over either explicit agreements
to the contrary, or competing local norms that might have interpreted
the arrangement. Writer William Bateman declared in 1860 that the
difference between partnership and employment, was actually
“obvious if we but consider the relations in question.” 225 As an
example, Bateman discussed the “quite usual” agreement to
compensate seamen with a share of their ship’s profits, an
arrangement which, he noted “has never been supposed” to create
partnership. 226 The reason that receiving a share of profits did not
make a seaman a partner was not because of the intentions declared
within the contract itself, but instead because everyone who dealt with
shipping knew that seamen weren’t partners: “The distinction, even
though seemingly refined, is definitely established by a series of
adjudications, and is not now to be questioned. . . .” 227
For observers like Bateman and Story, you ought to be able to tell
a partner from an employee simply by looking at the two parties. That
principle, which implicitly placed a lawyer or merchant like the author
himself in the role of observer, benefitted creditors and investors by
making impossible or very difficult those business arrangements that
would be unfamiliar to them. One easy quality for creditors to observe
was an imbalance in wealth and class between the two parties,
something that could easily be perceived by potential creditors, and
did not require knowledge of the negotiations and arrangements
between the two parties. Partners were expected to be richer and more
established than those they employed—and lawyers and judges
deployed this instinctive rule of thumb. In an 1858 case before an
intermediate-level New York court, noted for posterity by New York
case digester Charles Brightly, the creditor of a failed hay-buying
scheme argued that wealthy merchant Hall could not possibly be the
mere agent or employee of two smaller merchants Wardwell and
Bardwell, because “Hall was the capitalist; Wardwell and Bardwell were

225 WILLIAM O. BATEMAN, THE GENERAL COMMERCIAL LAW, AS RECOGNIZED IN THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 553 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1860).
226 Id. at 551.
227 Id. at 551–52.
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poor.” 228 According to this creditor, the three could be partners, or
the wealthy Hall could have employed the two poorer men, but the
reverse could not plausibly be imagined. His argument succeeded: the
three men were found partners.
By 1860, the underlying British commercial law that had initiated
this debate was itself evolving. In Cox v. Hickman, the court concluded
that, even when it came to distinguishing partners from creditors or
investors, taking a share of the profits was not conclusive proof of
partnership, but only presumptive. 229 That change in doctrine gave
further support to legal thinkers advocating for a labor exception to
the profits-partnership rule.
Yet even as legal writers assured their readers that there ought to
be no problems distinguishing a hired worker from a partner, cases
occupying the supposedly rare middle ground nonetheless piled up.
In Missouri in 1866, for example, Judge Nathaniel Holmes expected
that the line between partnership and work for hire should be clear
but was exasperated to find that litigants had confused the matter. 230
In Meyers v. Field, plaintiff Henry Meyers was a dry goods clerk running
a store at the behest of defendants who supplied his stock, taking part
of the profits while turning over the rest to his backers in the form of
agreed wholesale prices. 231 A few years later, his backers seized back
the premises, and the plaintiff argued he was still owed over $1700 in
profits. Both the pleadings and the underlying business arrangements
involved frustrated Judge Holmes. The original contract, which did
not label the business a partnership, appeared to Judge Holmes to be
either a fraudulent attempt at evading the law, or so incompetent that
its participants deserved their fate. He complained,
The arrangement seems to have been one of those not uncommon
attempts . . . , either designedly, or in ignorance of the law, . . . to
avoid the name, duties, liabilities and responsibilities of
partners . . . while entering into agreements and transactions
which, by the law of the land, constitute them partners, whatever
they may please to say or think about it, or by whatever name they
may choose to call it. 232

To recover in court, Judge Holmes insisted, this ill-treated junior
would have to conform the facts of his case to a claim of either
partnership or compensation for service. Until then, his claim would
228 Fitch v. Hall, 16 How. Pr. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858); see 2 FREDERICK C. BRIGHTLY,
A DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO SEPTEMBER 1875, at 2840 (New York, Banks & Bros. 1875).
229 Cox v. Hickman (1860) 11 Eng. Rep. 431, 446–47; 8 H.L.C. 268, 306–07.
230 Meyers v. Field, 37 Mo. 434, 439 (1866).
231 Id.
232 Id.
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be thrown out. Judge Holmes’s exasperation suggested that he had
faced this problem before, and likely would again.
E. Local Small-Business Norms as Fraud and Mistake
Judge Holmes’s suggestion that the purported partners were to
blame for the legal confusion their arrangements had caused
exemplified an increasingly common position among legal thinkers.
If legal thinkers could not work out a clear and easily applied default
rule with results less harsh than those of the original bright-line test, it
must be because small businesses themselves were trying to evade or
ignore the business norms they ought to understand. The idea that
contested partnership might indicate fraud was not new: as far back as
Purviance v. McClintee in 1820, Chief Justice Tilghman had justified his
application of the bright-line rule that a share of profits mandated
partnership with the remonstrance, “[i]n the present state of the
world, we cannot afford to part with any of the safe-guards against
fraud.” 233
Yet with the decline of the original bright-line rule, judges’
suspicion of relationships mixing work and ownership served a new
purpose, providing weight and justification to decisions firmly planting
enterprises on one side or the other. In 1848, evaluating potential
partnership within a small cotton factory where the alleged partner
had been paid a fraction of profits, a New York court acknowledged
that the mere fact of a “fluctuating and dubious compensation” would
not be enough to establish partnership, even though it “might serve as
a cover for usury.” 234 But that gratuitous expression of distaste
certainly did not hurt in the court’s ultimate conclusion that the “true
meaning” of the contracting parties’ agreement constituted partnership and that a local referee had erred in finding otherwise. 235
Fifteen years later, the same court applied similar logic to the
dispute between liquor dealer John Conklin and brothers Hiland and
Eli Barton, proprietors, respectively, of a hotel and store in Eagle
Bridge, New York. 236 In the court’s view, if creditor Conklin had
misunderstood the nature of the brothers’ business relationship, it
must have been because Eli Barton had violated “his plain duty . . . to
speak and to state fairly and honestly how the facts were.” 237 The
record gave no indication that Eli had been intentionally dishonest.
233 Purviance v. McClintee, 6 Serg. & Rawle 259, 261 (Pa. 1820).
234 Everett v. Coe, 5 Denio 180, 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
235 Id. at 184.
236 Conklin v. Barton, 43 Barb. 435, 435–36 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1864); see supra notes 3–
9 and accompanying text for my earlier discussion of the case.
237 Conklin, 43 Barb. at 440.
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Nevertheless, Eli could not be permitted to “exonerate himself from
responsibility.”238 Eli was liable for the hotel’s debts and, in the judges’
view, he deserved his fate. In an ironic twist, Eli Barton fired back with
a counterclaim: he argued that Henry Backman, Conklin’s agent who
had delivered the liquor, was himself Conklin’s partner, and Conklin
had therefore erred by not joining him as plaintiff. 239 But even though
Backman received a portion of Conklin’s profits, that payment for
Backman’s labor comfortably fit the now-established profits-as-wages
exception. 240 Conklin and Backman’s hierarchical arrangement had
now found a place within commercial law, while the Bartons’
relationship of mutual aid continued to challenge its boundaries.
In cases like Conklin v. Barton, courts penalized small businesses
for representing relationships as joint efforts without intending the
new legal definition of partnership. Those results were fair, in the
courts’ eyes, because simply by adopting business forms falling in
between or outside the rules of commercial law, small businesses
approached fraud. Furthering the goal of discouraging use of older
partnership forms, legal writers also began a broadly targeted
education campaign. The Philadelphia Journal of Law, addressed not
only to lawyers but to “the People of the United States,” was one effort
at education. 241 The motto of the journal, “[i]gnorance of the law
excuseth no man,” was both an encouragement to readers and something of a threat to those who turned their attentions elsewhere. 242 In
particular, the anonymous Philadelphia lawyers responsible for the
journal wanted to reach commercial men, explaining that they could
not afford to remain unfamiliar with the many laws that would “affect
them in the pursuit and transaction of their ordinary business.”243 In
addition to warnings, the journal also tried happier inducements: each
issue included jokes, anecdotes, and strange or exciting cases, aiming
for “instruction without tediousness, and amusement without
frivolity.”244 Despite its brief run, from 1830–31, the journal achieved
nationwide circulation, joining forces with the Journal of Health to find

238 Id. at 441.
239 Id. at 437.
240 Id. at 438.
241 Ass'n of Members of the Bar, Introduction, 1 J.L. 1, 2 (1830). My use of popular legal
materials like the Journal of Law represents methodological innovation. These magazines,
newspapers, novels, handbooks, and more constitute rich and fascinating source material
that have rarely been incorporated into accounts of doctrinal change and its social impact.
See Winsberg, supra note 32, at 2.
242 Ass'n of Members of the Bar, supra note 241, at 1.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 2.
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agents available to sell subscriptions in every state. 245 Similar legal
journals, later ones often growing out of earlier efforts, also targeted
both lawyers and interested laymen by providing up-to-the-minute,
easily digestible legal information. 246
The Journal of Law strongly advised all those entering a
partnership to place their intentions in writing: “The memory of
witnesses is frail . . . [and] the defect of proof would place confidence
at the mercy of dishonesty.” 247 If partnership was not the goal, its
writers advised, workers for hire should avoid “intermeddling with the
profits” of the business. 248 To do so was “like approaching a magazine,
with a lighted match. By extreme caution you may escape, but one
instant of heedlessness, involves you in ruin.”249 If all those going into
business followed this advice, there would be no difficulty in
determining which people owned the enterprise and were responsible
for it.
Beyond periodicals, legal writers promoted clearly defined labor
contracts in “every man his own lawyer” volumes. Published at an
increasingly rapid rate, these works gave brief explanations of
commonly used legal principles alongside legal forms that could be
repurposed for typical transactions. 250 In doing so, they imagined
audiences of smaller commercial men and farmers, rather than coastal
merchants, and adjusted their offerings accordingly. The 1831 Ohio
Pocket Lawyer, for example, included separate forms for a partnership
agreement, an “[a]greement with a [c]lerk or [w]orkman,” and other
agreements, forms which would prevent or resolve disputes about the
nature of the relationship. 251
These manuals purported to empower and protect small
businessmen by giving them the tools to understand the legal
principles that would be used to interpret their bargains. Indeed they
245 Ass'n of Members of the Bar, Notices and Advertisements, 1 J.L. 160, 160 (1830)
(providing that “[a]ll agents for the Journal of Health, are also authorized to receive
subscriptions for this work,” at a cost of $1.50 per year).
246 Similar law journals of the era included, for example, John E. Hall’s Philadelphia
publication The American Law Journal (1808–10 and 1813–17), revived in 1821 as The Journal
of Jurisprudence, and The Jurisprudent (published in Boston weekly from 1830–31). See 8
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 138–39 (Dumas Malone ed., 1932); The Jurisprudent,
PRINCETON U. LIBR.,
https://catalog.princeton.edu/catalog/99114358313506421
[https://perma.cc/A55R-9UGM].
247 Law of Partnership, 1 J.L. 241, 243 (1831).
248 Id. at 249.
249 Id.
250 See Richard L. Abel, Lawyer Self-Regulation and the Public Interest: A Reflection, 20
LEGAL ETHICS 115, 119 (2017).
251 See THE OHIO POCKET LAWYER, FORM BOOK, OR SELF-CONVEYANCER: CONTAINING
ALL THE NECESSARY LEGAL FORMS, USED IN THE STATE OF OHIO 52–53, 77–92 (A. & E. Picket
eds., Wheeling, Va., A. & E. Picket 1831).
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did: legal writers were right to warn readers against ignorance of the
emerging doctrine of merchants’ contract law as applied to small local
businesses. But the reason small businessmen had to learn to conform
their enterprises to the options laid out by merchants’ partnership law
was that courts had decided not to honor the system of contract
interpretation and default rules that had previously governed these
businesses. Manuals, magazines, and other popular sources helped
enforce a new third-party-favoring approach to contract’s background
rules.
Legal writers did not succeed entirely in their campaign of
persuasion: cases involving enterprises straddling the partnership/
employment line remained a constant fixture in courts through the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in part because the small
business form in which one partner contributed cash while the other
contributed labor remained so common. 252 But they did persuade
each other, and courts, that the dilemma in these cases ultimately
represented failure on the part of the contracting parties who had
created the enterprise. This rule—that contracting parties’ intentions
could not take a form that failed to match the expectations of thirdparty creditors—would last even as the importance of partnership as
business form ultimately declined. 253
By using fraud and mistake to justify prioritizing third-party
interests, judges and writers had both transformed contract law and
thoroughly camouflaged their work in the process. The legal system
had faced a conflict between the background rules favored by one
group, entrepreneurs contracting within their own local small
businesses, and another, the third-party creditors and investors of
those businesses. It chose third parties. By recasting contractual terms
less intuitive to third parties as fraudulent or mistaken, however, judges

252 In 1942, for example, an American Law Reports annotation found numerous
instances in which “the express provisions of a contract, if considered separately, may be
typical, some of a partnership and others of an employment relation,” explaining that “[i]t
is this situation which gives rise to the problem with which this annotation is concerned.”
E.H. Schopflocher, Annotation, Partnership as Distinguished from Employment (Where Rights of
Parties Inter Se or Their Privies Are Concerned, 137 A.L.R. 6 (1942). In this era,
partnership/employee disputes developed a new significance: the boundary line became a
key area of contestation for worker benefits eligibility, as I explore elsewhere. See Winsberg,
supra note 174. At both the state and federal level, a determination of partnership could
disqualify workers from workman’s compensation, unemployment benefits, and more. This
line of cases related to and informed the simultaneously emerging distinction between
employee and independent contractor. See generally id.
253 With the rise of LLCs in the 1990s, more small businesses chose that form instead
of partnership, reducing the importance of the partnership/employee boundary line for
creditors; still, partnership law’s legacy in work law continued to grow in importance. See
Winsberg, supra note 174.

1316

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:3

and writers made their decision look like not a choice at all, but simply
an expression of logic and morality. Future generations would forget
the third-party-favoring transformation of partnership contracts
because the long process of common-law evolution had covered its
tracks as it rolled forward.
Conventional wisdom holds that the nineteenth century was for
better and worse the peak of freedom of contract. 254 It was the era, in
our memory, when parties were most at liberty to choose any terms
they could agree upon, without intervention from either the
hierarchical strictures of the feudal past, or the regulatory cosseting
that would come later. 255 Yet upon closer inspection, contract law at
its Industrial Revolution peak remained as full of limitations, default
assumptions, and arbitrary interpretive rules as it ever had been,
continuing to guide or force parties’ agreements onto select, legally
enforceable paths. What began to change in the nineteenth century
was the function of those constraints, which increasingly shifted toward
prioritizing the expectations of third parties who held financial
interests in the bargains of others. Creditors fought—and in many
respects won—a battle to shape partnership contract doctrine to their
advantage.
IV.

GRAPPLING WITH THIRD-PARTY PRESSURE IN MODERN CONTRACT
LAW

The process that transformed partnership contract to favor thirdparty interests over those of contracting parties was not unique to the
nineteenth century, nor to partnership. Contract law continues to
balance the competing interests of intervening third parties against
those of contracting parties. 256 Yet observers and practitioners have
been curiously silent on this aspect of doctrine, and to the choice
between competing values that it represents. Nor have they considered
third-party pressure itself as an important feature of many bargains.
This inattention has had consequences. No systematic analysis of the
larger issue informs judges’ piecemeal adjudications between

254 See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 21; Harold C. Havighurst, Limitations Upon Freedom of
Contract, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 167, 167 (1979); Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6
CORNELL L.Q. 365, 365–66 (1921).
255 For the classic statement of the law’s progression “from [s]tatus to [c]ontract,” see
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 170 (London, John Murray 1861) (emphasis
omitted).
256 See Bagchi, supra note 2, at 211 (identifying elements of contract law that currently
favor third-party perspectives in contract interpretation, notably in the interpretation of
merger contracts).
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contracting parties and third parties who hope to meddle in their
bargains.
In this Part, I first consider the powerful project of finding and
revealing contract’s third-party preferences. Since the nineteenth
century, contract law has included many background rules prioritizing
third-party viewpoints in various substantive contexts, often without
acknowledging them as such. Some of these rules may well be neutral
or even salutary: they distribute the benefit that comes with having
one’s viewpoint enforced in ways that are consistent with social good.
Others stifle or misinterpret parties’ efforts in ways echoing the
nineteenth-century small business experience. Some may even have
elements of both qualities. Where contract rules create previously
unacknowledged distributive consequences between third parties and
contracting parties, they might be revised within common-law
doctrine, or left in place but limited or compensated for legislatively.
The first step, however, is identifying and acknowledging third-party
preference within the law.
Next, I extend my argument outside the terrain of doctrine and
into legislation. I consider how legislative limits could, but do not
currently, remediate the effects of third-party pressure on individual
contracts. Redressing unfair results that might otherwise be produced
through contract is not a new legislative project. Yet lawmakers have
consistently focused their efforts on injustice created by differences in
power between the two contracting parties. In one such moment of
reform, spanning the middle decades of the twentieth century,
legislators created new limits on certain kinds of contracts, including
employment, housing, and consumer credit and sales, designed to
protect the weaker party in each of those bargains. Because lawmakers
gave little thought to third-party influence on contracts, however, they
created legislative exceptions that systematically excluded many
bargains with small businesses from protection, even where the moving
force behind the bargain came from a much larger third party. Recent
evolutions in enterprise and labor structure have only exacerbated the
impact of these loopholes. Deeper attention to third-party pressure,
though, could correct those oversights relatively easily.
A. Third-Party Preference in Contract’s Background Rules
The background rules of contract law matter. 257 Through default
rules, interpretive rules, and limits on contract terms, the law wrestles
with how bargains incomplete on the page can be shaped to better
reflect what parties would have wanted, to promote social good and
257 “Background rules” are the defaults, interpretive rules, and unwaivable limits that
supplement a contract’s text. See Craswell, supra note 12, at 489–90.
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economic efficiency, or for other projects. 258 Though parties can
theoretically bargain around background rules, doing so has costs,
often prohibitive ones. Haggling over contract terms damages
relationships, implying a stance of reduced trust and inviting contemplation of worst-case scenarios. 259 The legal project of identifying and
altering undesirable terms creates costs of time and money, too. 260 The
burdens of departing from the norm are weighty: even minimal
transaction costs associated with departing from default rules can
prevent a bargain altogether. 261 And of course all these burdens weigh
more heavily on parties who are less legally sophisticated and whose
smaller-stakes bargains are more readily swamped by transaction
costs. 262
In recognition of the importance of these background rules,
courts, scholars, and doctrinal projects like the Restatement and
Uniform Commercial Code constantly weigh their distributional
consequences between the two contracting parties. 263 Should the
drafter’s perspective prevail, for example, or that of the party who
mainly accepted terms written by its counterpart? 264 Within particular
kinds of contracts or contract terms, what defaults promote creation of
more economic value by the parties, and which ones most fairly
distribute the burden of departing from the norm? 265 To answer these
questions, scholars and lawyers consider the respective positions of
each party and the consequences for each of the potential default
rules. 266
Rules benefitting third parties at the expense of contracting
parties have equally significant distributive consequences compared to
those that settle interpretive disputes between two contracting parties.
Yet their consequences have hardly been examined, either by
commentators and codifiers of contract law, or by scholars. 267 This

258 See id. at 491.
259 See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 36, at 652; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 36, at
88; Johnston, supra note 36, at 618.
260 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 264 (1985).
261 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 733, 746 (1992).
262 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 36, at 676 n.117.
263 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default
Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2016) (“A long-standing project of academics and
lawyers attempts to supplement common law contract rules with substantive default rules
and default standards.”).
264 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 36, at 105 n.80.
265 Id. at 91.
266 See id. at 92–95.
267 See supra Part I.
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enormous oversight leaves room for a cavalcade of accidental injustice,
invisible within unexamined and seemingly neutral rules.
Third parties indeed now benefit from many of contract’s
background rules. When they intervene to promote an alternate
interpretation of a contract, they often win. Unwary enterprises whose
structure is interpreted by third-party observers as partnership are still
today liable on that basis, even if their intentions were something else
entirely. 268 When one party has a fiduciary duty to another on the basis
of a contract between them, that duty is sometimes interpreted to
extend to an interested third party. 269 In the context of mergers, one
of the few relatively well-studied areas of third-party influence,
elements of doctrine promote third-party interpretations of contracts
over those of either of the parties, too. 270 For example, if a merger
agreement affects the rights of creditors of either of the two parties,
ambiguities in the nature of those effects may be decided in favor of
the creditors. 271 Beyond explicit elements of doctrine, courts also seem
inclined to favor third-party interpretations more generally, without
acknowledging that they are doing so. For example, though the
Uniform Commercial Code authorizes courts to enforce the customs
of particular industries where they appear to have informed the
parties’ understanding of their contract, a preliminary examination
suggests that they are less likely to do so where a third-party litigant
from another industry alleges they did not share that understanding. 272
268 See BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.12(b) (delineating modern theory in which
purported partners may be liable to third parties where they have held themselves out as
partners, and noting that “[i]t is sometimes quite ambiguous whether the representation
of association in business amounts to a representation of partnership”). For cases
privileging third-party interpretation of ambiguous statements potentially establishing
partnership, see, for example, O’Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. Taleghani, 525 F. Supp.
750, 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (in a case of two Iranian citizens who believed their business
to fall within the Iranian legal concept of an “establishment,” nonetheless finding that the
purported partner’s “contention that he was unaware of the significance of his
representations . . . that he was a partner . . . is immaterial”); Phillip Van Heusen, Inc. v.
Korn, 460 P.2d 549, 550 (Kan. 1969) (imposing partnership liability on a father and son on
the basis of a letter explaining the two were “planning to start a clothing business”);
Volkman v. DP Associates, 268 S.E.2d 265, 268 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
partnership liability was potentially established by the statement “I am happy that we will be
working with you” and other behavioral cues).
269 Bagchi, supra note 2, at 246.
270 Id. at 212.
271 Id. at 250.
272 See U.C.C. § 1-303 (AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LS.
2020). For a case declining to find merchant custom informing a contract in the face of
third-party challenge, see, for example, Blonder & Co. v. Citibank, N.A., 808 N.Y.S.2d 214,
216–19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding no accepted custom relating to typical letter of credit
practice in interpreting the contract between two parties who, as part of the deal, sought a
letter of credit from a third-party bank).
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These third-party victories may produce both undesirable
consequences and beneficial ones. In some instances, as in this
Article’s historical example, a powerful third party—say, a creditor of
one party—lobbies to enforce its expectations and interpretations over
the competing norms of the industry that the contracting parties
themselves belong to. 273 In other instances, a vulnerable third party
has relied on its own understanding of a contract, and asks for
protection by the law from an alternate interpretation that would
impinge on its interests: say, an employee of a company merging with
another who argues for a particular interpretation of that merger
agreement. 274 In other cases, both dynamics are at stake.
Each scenario calls for action on the part of contract law. But how
can we tell them apart? The answer, I hypothesize, depends in large
part on the kind of bargain at issue. Different third parties exert
different kinds of pressure over merger contracts compared to
employment contracts compared to consumer contracts, and more.
These subject-specific branches of law—corporate and business law,
employment law, commercial law, and so on—already contain many of
the interpretive and default rules that regulate contracts in these areas.
It is in these branches of doctrine that, in many cases, third parties have
had the opportunity to produce favorable rules. Conversely, these are
also the places where the real-world impact of third-party-favoring
doctrine can be evaluated.
Across-the-board modification of the common law of all contracts
is therefore likely not the ideal tool for remedying the excesses of thirdparty interaction with contracts. Blanket interpretive rules—like Aditi
Bagchi’s proposal to interpret contract terms, when ambiguous, in
favor of third-party interests—run the risk of creating new unfairness
when they mean to balance the scales. 275 This holds particularly true
where the ambiguity results from a difference in business norms and
understandings between the kinds of people who are typically the
contracting parties, and those who are typically interested third parties.
There, the identity of each group matters in determining who needs
contract law’s protection.
Efforts to discern third-party interests in contract law are
enormously important, yet require painstaking, clear-eyed work.
Default rules in general often fly under the radar: legal analysis may
fold them into the interpretation of the contract in general, without
stopping to identify their application and recognize its impact. 276
When it comes to third parties, that effect grows even more pro273
274
275
276

See supra Part III.
See Bagchi, supra note 2, at 250–51.
Id. at 212.
Craswell, supra note 12, at 516.
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nounced. Camouflaged beneath judicial language of “objectivity” and
ease of interpretation lurk real choices about who must act to avoid an
unintended consequence, and what sacrifices they must make to assure
legal success in doing so. Judges and scholars alike therefore often fail
to notice elements of contract doctrine that systematically favor
particular third parties. Examining the historical transformation of
partnership contracts, however, reveals what has long remained
obscure. Armed with the insight that third-party preference in
contract doctrine can transform whole worlds of business practice,
leaving unsuspecting contracting parties to face unintended outcomes,
legal analysts today must examine when and how it does so and with
what consequences.
B. Legislative Remedies for Third-Party Pressure on Individual Contracts
Modern contract rules derive not only from common law, but also
from legislation. Failure to consider the contractual role of third
parties has had consequences here, too. In this Section, I move from
third parties’ influence on contract doctrine in general, to the pressure
they may place on individual contracts. In the mid-twentieth century,
lawmakers took on the project of remedying unequal bargaining
power in contracts involving especially high human stakes and
especially vulnerable parties. Their effort constitutes one of the
central accomplishments of twentieth-century lawmaking; yet because
reform energy focused squarely on the unequal two-party relationship,
with almost no thought given to third-party pressure, these laws have
left open important loopholes.
From the 1930s through the 1970s, federal and state legislatures
placed new bounds on the ways parties could make contracts of
employment, tenancy, consumer credit and sales, and more,
preventing the more powerful party in each case from including
provisions in conflict with vital societal norms. 277 In federal employment law, new limits ranged from the limits on pay, hours, and work
conditions imposed by laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, to the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act, and many
more. 278 New limits on housing contracts included those imposed by

277 For an overview of work legislation following these reforms, see, for example, PAUL
C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
(1990). For the history of their creation, see, for example, JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE
RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE
(2006).
278 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
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the Fair Housing Act in 1968. 279 States and localities, too, created new
rules for work and housing contracts: for example, a wave of new
legislation beginning in the 1960s replaced or modified the common
law of landlord-tenant contracts. 280 In Washington, D.C., and
elsewhere, new laws regulated installment sales and other
“unconscionable” sales contracts. 281 These laws singled out situations
in which one party to the contract was much stronger than the other,
preventing that party from imposing certain terms that legislatures
declared unfair and socially undesirable. 282
To scholars, these developments appeared to mark the end of an
era. Grant Gilmore famously declared the “[d]eath of [c]ontract” in
1974, while P.S. Atiyah declared the “[f]all of [f]reedom of [c]ontract”
a few years later. 283 They and others argued that the growth of
contract-limiting regulation, in combination with courts’
strengthening of doctrines like unconscionability and promissory
estoppel, were replacing consensual contract with other kinds of
mutual obligation—perhaps for the better. As it turned out, contract
was alive and well. 284 New bounds on contract were, in the end, no
different from old bounds on contract. They placed outer limits on
the content of certain kinds of bargains without otherwise
undermining contract as doctrine and practice. 285 Despite their
nonlethality to contract in general, though, these efforts to remedy
particular consequences of unequal bargaining power were significant
and lasting. When it came to specific kinds of contracts like
employment and tenancy, legislation and regulation did important
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2 to –3); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78).
279 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31).
280 See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.
L. REV. 503 (1982).
281 See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102
GEO. L.J. 1383, 1425–29 (2014) (discussing the District of Columbia Consumer Credit
Protection Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-200, sec. 4, § 28-3805, 85 Stat. 665, 670 (codified as
amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3805 (West 2021))).
282 For example, a 1968 federal commission observed that unscrupulous lenders “take
advantage of their superior knowledge of credit buying by engaging in various exploitative
tactics,” ultimately leading to consumer credit reform. Id. at 1425–26 (quoting NAT’L
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 140 (1968)).
283 GILMORE, supra note 21 at 3; ATIYAH, supra note 21, at 1.
284 See Ellen A. Peters, Foreword, 90 NW. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995).
285 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace by
Contract Again, 28 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 351, 364 (2007) (“Public law sets boundaries
on private ordering, for example, through ‘public policy’ limits on enforceability of
contracts.”).
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work to remediate unequal bargaining power by imposing constraints
on contracts. 286
Across the board, however, the lawmakers searching for unequal
bargains in contract law gave little thought to the idea that third parties
might be responsible for them. As a result, they left loopholes that in
part undermined their intended goals. Contract-limiting statutes
made exceptions where the more powerful party—employer,
landlord—was in fact not particularly powerful. Nearly all midtwentieth century employment legislation exempted employers whose
workforces were below a certain size. 287 These exceptions had logical
appeal. If employment legislation meant to place outer limits on
contract terms where the bargaining parties were in vastly unequal
positions, it stood to reason that, if the employer was in fact not
particularly large then no such inequality was at issue.
These exceptions presume, however, that the pressure toward
unfair contracts comes from the employer itself. They therefore
ignore the ways that these small entities may face pressure from thirdparty creditors, investors, or part-owners in their bargains with
employees. That gap in the law leaves real potential for unfair and
unforeseen outcomes. A modern contract-maker—say, an employee—
as she bargains with the small business in front of her, may be unaware
of the third-party interests invisibly shaping the deal. Or, she might be
well aware of the business’s affiliation with a third party, for example,
a franchisor—but not understand that being the employee of a
franchise or subcontractor drastically alters the protections available
286 KLEIN, supra note 277, at 3–4.
287 In order of ascending thresholds, see, for example, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b))
(applying Title VI anti-discrimination protections only where employers have at least fifteen
employees); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101, 104 Stat.
327, 330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)) (applying protection against
disability discrimination in employment only where employers have at least fifteen
employees); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 11, 81
Stat. 602, 605 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)) (applying protection against age
discrimination only where employers have at least twenty employees, an expansion from
the statute’s initial threshold of fifty employees); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101, 107 Stat. 6, 7 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i))
(applying requirement of unpaid family or medical leave only where employers have at least
fifty employees). Even where contract-limiting employment laws apply to employers of all
sizes, third parties who influence contract terms nonetheless evade liability for the penalties
these laws impose except in very limited circumstances. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, §3(g), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(g)) (applying limits on employee wages and hours, among other protections, to
anyone who “suffer[s] or permit[s]” an employee to work regardless of the employer’s size).
FLSA’s uniquely broad definition of “employer” encompasses a small set of third parties,
but remains limited to the very most involved. See infra note 294.
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to her relative to being an employee of the larger company. Most
importantly, even if she understands the deal and its limitations
precisely, she may well accept it anyway because she faces the kind of
bargaining pressure produced by a very large company, the third party,
even though her actual co-bargainer is a small business exempt from
oversight.
Such scenarios are omnipresent and growing in significance
within the evolving twenty-first century economy. In the world of
business, large players remain the very small minority. Over 99% of
firms are small businesses. 288 And when it comes to employment, an
especially high-stakes contract, 49% of private-sector employees
bargain with a small business employer. 289 Small businesses, because
they are small, are often significantly beholden to larger and more
powerful players. Those larger players, if they choose, can exert
significant influence on small businesses’ internal contracts. To take
an especially obvious case, 2% of businesses are franchises, directly
beholden to a franchisor, who may very well dictate key terms of
employment agreements. 290 Other small businesses are subcontractors
for larger ones: at tech giants like Google, Amazon, and Facebook, for
example, armies of small subcontractors are the ones directly
responsible for employing many of the janitors, content moderators,
software engineers, and more who work on behalf of these
companies. 291 Others, for example, start-ups, have taken on investment capital explicitly conditioned on the investors’ ability to direct
some of the business’s behavior, potentially including its contracts with
others. 292 Finally, some may be in debt to a demanding creditor; or
they may rely in large part on a single customer or supplier with the
ability to dictate terms. 293

288 OFF. OF ADVOC., SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2012).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 3.
291 J. Alden Estruth, Subcontracting: Silicon Valley’s Riskiest Work, WASH. POST (Nov. 16,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/11/16
/subcontracting-silicon-valleys-riskiest-work/ [https://perma.cc/VVL5-PWM5].
292 See, e.g., Steve Blank, How to Make Startup Stock Options a Better Deal for Employees,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/04/how-to-make-startup-stockoptions-a-better-deal-for-employees [https://perma.cc/7NWM-9QUG] (noting that “VCs
have intentionally changed the more than 50-year-old social contract with startup
employees” by, for example, pressuring founders to offer stock options to employees on
less favorable terms).
293 See, e.g., Tomas Jandik & William R. McCumber, Creditor Governance 1 (Oct. 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209460 (arguing that creditors
meaningfully influence companies’ ongoing management decisions even when debt is not
in default).
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What should we make of these strong influences on a small
business’s contracts? One answer is: nothing. They are part of the
bundle of preferences that any contractor brings to its bargains.
Indeed, part of the structure of contract law is that, absent special
circumstances, the reasons for a party’s preferences have no effect on
the contract itself. 294 The contract simply enforces the choices that
each party has made in deciding to contract. 295 Of course, this is true
enough. But, as I have discussed above, contracts are regulated and
limited in some contexts because lawmakers have determined that
these contexts are likely to produce bargains so unfair that they are
socially undesirable. 296 Third-party pressure thus deserves more
examination, to determine in what circumstances it may rise to that
level.
Legislative efforts to identify and redress unfair pressure in
contracts, then, have imagined that pressure as coming from
bargaining parties and have focused their attention accordingly. But
addressing this blind spot would not be conceptually difficult.
Legislators and regulators could simply make small-business exceptions more limited, adjusting their breadth to reflect the pressure the
vulnerable party is actually up against where a third party is heavily
involved. They could even hold third parties responsible for regulatory
penalties in some instances. 297 By understanding the pervasive
294 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV.
73, 73 (2006).
295 Barnett, supra note 16, at 299.
296 See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text.
297 Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement, particularly under a short-lived Obama-era
interpretation and related caselaw, offers a suggestive example of liability for highly
involved third parties. An employer who violates FLSA’s wage and hour requirements must
pay back wages and penalties. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018). A “joint
employer” who is not the employer of record but is nonetheless heavily involved in
determining the employee’s work conditions may be equally liable as an employer. 29
C.F.R. §§ 791.1–791.2 (2020). Under the Obama Administration’s “economic realities”
test, the joint employer category was expanded further, growing to encompass certain
relatively involved franchisors and contractors employing subcontractors. See U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2016-1 (Jan. 20, 2016), 2016
WL 284582. The Fourth Circuit took the analysis one step further by considering a third
party’s control of an employer just as important as its control of the employee: it held
DirectTV a potential joint employer of its subcontractors’ employees on the basis of
DirectTV’s direction and control of its subcontractors. Hall v. DIRECTV, 846 F.3d 757, 761
(4th Cir. 2017). Trump Administration regulation retracted the economic realities test in
favor of a narrower approach limiting joint employer analysis to the most clear-cut cases of
third-party supervision of employees. 29 C.F.R. §§ 791.1–791.2 (2020). Current proposed
regulation would revive the Obama-era approach to joint employment. See Robert J.
Simandl & John A. Rubin, Labor Law Reform on the Horizon: Ten Things to Watch Under the
PRO Act, NAT’L. L. REV. (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/labor-lawreform-horizon-ten-things-to-watch-under-pro-act [https://perma.cc/HX6U-RHZ8].
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influence on internal contracts by third parties, then, we can find and
undo past omissions.
CONCLUSION
When the members of a firm take a loan, they invite a new party
into their existing contractual relationship. They welcome in a
competing set of interpretive norms and default rules, perhaps
fundamentally altering the terms on which they work together, often
without even realizing that they have done so. That was what
happened to, for example, the Barton brothers in 1864, who had no
idea that a simple liquor purchase on credit could recast their
relationship of mutual aid as equivalent to formal co-ownership
because it replaced their own interpretive norms with those of their
creditor. 298
It took many decades to construct this third-party-favoring state of
affairs. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, local courts
trying low-value cases had tended to interpret small businesses’
contracts in light of local small-business norms. Higher courts
handling higher-stakes cases, meanwhile, had constructed an
emerging commercial law doctrine around the norms of the
community of merchant traders whose disputes it resolved. In the midnineteenth century, these formerly separate business and legal worlds
collided because the expansion of markets led sophisticated merchants
to loan to and invest in local operations. American courts and legal
thinkers experimented with a variety of approaches to mediate
between them. Ultimately, courts sided with the merchants in their
role as third parties. Their business norms, and the contract
interpretive and default rules that enforced them, could and would
displace the competing norms that had previously governed small
businesses.
The rise of partnership contract’s third-party preference was as
influential as it was unobserved. Where contracting parties’ intentions
clashed with third-party interpretive norms, courts reinterpreted the
parties’ efforts as fraud or mistake. That left the third-party perspective
as the “objective” interpretive view. Yet third-party meddling, though
camouflaged, is not invisible. It alters and constrains contractual
relationships, especially those of parties too small or unsophisticated
to fight back. By uncovering it, we unearth new opportunities to make
contract’s boundaries and defaults fairer to each of its participants.

298

Conklin v. Barton, 43 Barb. 435, 435 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1864).

